Worldview

Things small states should know

2008-08-16T19:09:00.006+03:00

Watching the crisis in the Caucasus unfold, I realized that the Georgian leadership probably did not receive the brief manual that is normally given out to every independent state when it is granted its sovereignty license by the United Nations. Not many people are aware of this manual. I was told about it by a veteran Cypriot diplomat, who noted that the leadership in Cyprus received their copy only on August 14, 1974. That was the day Turkish "peacekeepers" embarked on the second stage of their military operation on the island, which left its mark on Cyprus to this day. So, like the Georgians, the Cypriots did not receive the booklet when it would have been most useful. In the hope that greater awareness of this publication will help other small states avoid the tragic fate of Georgia and Cyprus, here are some of its key points, in no particular order of importance.

Sovereignty is not made of kryptonite. In other words, you cannot hide behind it and expect it to stop bullets. Sovereignty is a concept that makes sense to great powers. Small states haven't a chance in hell of upholding their sovereignty unless they have an ace up their sleeve. This normally comes in the form of patronage from one of the great powers, and even that is not foolproof. Unfortunately for the Georgians, like naive upstarts, they bought the empty promises of the Bush administration.

Independence is overrated. No small state can be truly independent, and it is arguably a difficult achievement for even the greatest of powers. The desire for independence should not be allowed to blur reality. It can only be relative for small states, and must be balanced between their minimum ambitions and the aspirations of their most powerful neighbor. Georgia's desire to become a full-fledged member of NATO, with Putin's Russia hulking over it, clearly reflected an unbalanced sense of independence, and a misunderstanding of the motivations and policies of Western powers.

Do not be flattered by the praise of more powerful states: The measure of your success should be yours to determine. Georgia was lauded for its democracy, its pro- Western attitude, its support of liberty and freedom, and its contribution to the war in Iraq. Was any of this helpful when the Russians came barging in? The answer is a glaring "nope." So, Georgia failed the small-state test. By the way, being a democracy did not help Cyprus in 1974: The United States still backed the military dictatorship in Greece when it invaded the island, first through a coup against Cyprus' legitimate government, and did nothing to prevent the subsequent invasion, ethnic cleansing, division and occupation of the island by another U.S. client and NATO ally, Turkey. Nor has the fact that since the 1974 catastrophe, the Republic of Cyprus has proved to be a model democracy, a bastion of political stability and a successful economy - truly, one of a handful of shining stars in the post-colonial abyss of failures - helped the island to regain its full sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Do the math, cut your losses. This means you should avoid spending outrageous sums on defense and not overestimate the value of territorial integrity. Small states will never be able to truly defend themselves against the hulks dominating the international arena. They will also have a very tough time preserving territories that are obviously determined to break off from the whole. It may be unfair, and it may be illegal, but breakaway minorities cannot be controlled unless there is a clear decision to use force against them. As the cases of Kosovo and now South Ossetia have shown, even a willingness to keep those minorities at bay by force may ultimately yield only a Pyrrhic victory. Therefore - and this is true in Cyprus, too, which is currently in the midst of a much-lauded negotiating process for reunification - the possibility of breaking away from the separatists should be seriously considered. Let them go their own way. If the Cypriot case is anything to go by, the Greek Cypriots have done quite well since they were separated from their Turkish compatriots, though perhaps not quite as well as if they had parted for good, and not maintained an official insistence on reunification at nearly any cost. The Georgians and the Serbs would do well to just let separatist territories go - the eventual benefits will far outweigh the pain and the nationalist opposition at home.

A final word of warning: The international arena is in constant flux, and small states should follow the changes closely. For the most part, it will not be these states that will determine the new world order. Therefore, they should at least aspire to be on the mailing list when the new rule book on international relations comes out.

This article was first published in Haaretz on August 15, 2008.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1011995.html#resp

Georgia's Gamble

2008-08-12T18:59:00.005+03:00

This article first appeared in Haaretz on August 11, 2008.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1010241.html#resp

In one scenario presented in a 2001 video game, U.S. Special Forces are inserted into the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to help counter a Russian invasion. This might have been just a game, but it eerily presaged a Russian nationalist government flexing its muscles in the Caucasus in 2008. However, it is highly unlikely that in real life, American, or for that matter any Western troops will be brought in to help the Georgians in stemming the Russian onslaught.

The fog of war and information is still thick, but the first impression is that the youthful, pro-Western Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, miscalculated badly when he ordered his forces into the breakaway region of South Ossetia. But analysts had expressed worry in the past that Saakashvili was impetuous and prone to overreact, as he did during a November 2007 crackdown against protesters. And there are signs that the Russians may have laid a trap in South Ossetia, gradually exacerbating the situation, leading the Georgians to make a play for a blitz operation aimed at restoring Tbilisi's sovereignty over the territory. It seems that the words of an expert on the region, Dr. Dimitris Triantaphyllou, were prophetic when he warned at a conference on regional security last summer that, "The Georgians have a mistaken notion that the Americans will come in to save them." Indeed, the West had been doing its best to avoid getting sucked into a conflict in the Caucasus in any real way, and in retrospect the decision to refuse Georgia NATO membership at the Bucharest summit in April was correct.

A showdown between the Medvedev/Putin regime and the Rose Revolution Georgians, who took over following the resignation of former Soviet leader Edward Shevardnadze in 2003, had been building up for some time. Some dire scenarios have the Russians wanting to push Saakashvili to the brink, replacing him with a more pliable government in Tbilisi and restoring Russian predominance - and near-complete control over the energy pipelines - in the Caucasus. The bid by the Saakashvili government for both NATO and future European Union membership is perceived by Russia as a direct threat to its "natural" sphere of influence and a challenge to the fundamentals of Vladimir Putin's strategy for restoring Moscow's status as a major power through command of energy supplies to Europe.

As the UN Security Council haggles and maneuvers toward agreement on a resolution that Moscow will surely insist is lacking in meaning, the immediate question is whether the conflict will escalate. There are fears that in spite of the Georgian call for a cease-fire, the clashes will turn into an all-out Russian ground offensive, perhaps sparked by "volunteer" forces flowing into South Ossetia from another Moscow-backed breakaway region, Abkhazia, and even from Chechnya. Clearly, rhetoric and emotions are running high, with hyperbolic language and terms that are so familiar from recent conflicts, like "ethnic conflict" and "genocide." But it is also clear that a long-lasting conflict would not favor either side.

The Georgians can certainly not carry on the fight against the Russian mass for much longer, and unless Moscow makes a move against Tbilisi, it is unlikely that the Western powers will offer more than words of support to Saakashvili. For its part, Russia has already achieved two main objectives: It has established the status quo ante in the breakaway territories even more firmly than before; and has shown its power on the ground, reaffirming its sphere of influence in the Caucasus and possibly other areas on its borders (Ukraine, for example). Will it now seek Saakashvili's head?

Besides its local and immediate implications, this recent flare-up in the Caucasus raises a much broader question about the nature of world order, the place of small countries, like Georgia, in the international system, and the question of sovereignty. For all their mistakes, the Georgians are right when they point out that the fighting in their country is about the fundamentals of international law, that their sovereignty has been violated by Russia and that without Moscow, Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatists would be unable to challenge the central government in Tbilisi.

It is hard for any citizen of a small country not to feel sympathy for the Georgians who, unlike the Serbians, do not have the likes of Slobodan Milosevic and the massacre at Srebrenica to contend with as they seek international sympathy. It is no wonder that the Russian government spokesmen have gone so far as to raise the possibility that Saakashvili should be taken to The Hague as a war criminal, in a blatant effort to defuse the David vs. Goliath imagery.

But public sympathy will do little for Georgia, just as it does for Tibet and Darfur, and as it did in Chechnya and the former Yugoslavia. In the international chess game, small actors like Georgia have little choice but to play by the rules dictated by the behemoths on their borders - until the tables are turned and new opportunities for genuine independence are created.
Michalis Firillas
August 10, 2008

The Paradox that is Iran

2008-05-09T15:27:00.021+03:00

1883-1957

This article first appeared in Haaretz on 9 May, 2008

Nothing smacks more of a "clash of civilizations" than the classic Greek-Persian confrontation of antiquity. That's what they tell us, anyway. Because soon after the clash, it turned into something that was more akin to an amalgamation of civilizations, with the emergence of a new, multicultural environment that influenced, if not outright dominated, much of the Euro- Mediterranean world until the Church and Christianity became official organs of empire.

Fast forward to April 13, 2008: Iran's National Library held a ceremony inaugurating a Greek section and commemorating Nikos Kazantzakis - of "Zorba the Greek" fame - who died 50 years ago. The event, co-sponsored by the Greek Embassy in Tehran, was attended by a number of Iranian officials. Evangelos Venetis, a Greek scholar on Iran who presented a paper on Kazantzakis at the event, told me that, "Iranians consider his works a treasury of freedom literature, and that is why he is highly respected not only by the academic elite in Iran, but also among other strata of Iranian society, including politicians and bureaucrats."

Undoubtedly, Kazantzakis, because of the breadth of his work and his thirst for answers to existential questions, means different things to different readers. Hence, it's little surprise there are Iranians who find his works appealing. But there is a difference between individual Iranians deciding on the importance of a particular message in the work of Kazantzakis, and the Islamic Republic of Iran offering official recognition of a figure as controversial as he. Indeed, the choice of Kazantzakis over other Greek authors is ironic, but perhaps it is also reflective of the paradox that is Iran.

Kazantzakis is not just any author - not in Greece, and certainly not for a theocracy like Iran. He was passed over by the Nobel selection committee in 1956 because of the controversy his work had stirred, particularly among conservatives and church elements. He is probably one of a handful of writers to have managed to enter the proverbial "black books" of both the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches - the latter went so far as to excommunicate him. He toyed with communism, but was sufficiently self-aware to see the real face of the Bolshevik revolution, and turned his back on it in the 1920s, though he never relinquished his empathy for the common man.

Just as he explored political philosophies, Kazantzakis delved into religions - challenging clergy and placing more faith in man than he did in any God. Indeed, he wrestled with God to the point where he did not hesitate to place God in man's shoes, faced with man's temptations, suffering and anxieties. Most of all, Kazantzakis was obsessed with freedom, and recognizing the myriad chains that bound humanity, be they in the form of basic daily needs, social mores or religious authority, he struggled to find solutions. More than anything else, then, Kazantzakis was a humanist - praised by the likes of Albert Camus, Thomas Mann and Albert Schweitzer.

It is easy to criticize the Iranian state for its oppressive policies. The Iranian people have never had much freedom, whether under shahs or mullahs. And so, the decision to commemorate Kazantzakis is not only curious, but perhaps even hopeful. Mahmud Fazeli, Iran's charge d'affaires in Athens, wrote an introduction for the event that was quoted extensively in Iran's English media. The diplomat, clearly aware of the paradox entailed in honoring Kazantzakis, valiantly tried to avoid having to explain how an author notorious for his criticism of the clergy could be officially accepted by a state that is ruled by clerics. Even though Venetis qualifies the anti-clericalism of Kazantzakis as not being absolute, he acknowledges that "the fact that this event took place under the most official Iranian academic patronage clearly shows that reality is much more complicated in Iran."

Fazeli opted to attribute to Kazantzakis the broadest possible cultural and philosophical traits. He wrote that "although many remember Kazantzakis for his banned book 'The Last Temptation of Christ,' his world is not confined to a book or a certain line of thought." He described him as believing that man is "on a permanent odyssey" in search of God. For those who "regard him as a Christian," Fazeli says they are missing the complexity of the author: "Simultaneously or consecutively, he has been a Christian, an irreligious person, an anarchist, a humanist and a stoic."

Is there a message here we may all be missing about Iran? As Fazeli tried to explain about Kazantzakis, whose works he said "sometimes contradict each other," Iran is a paradox, too. In a recent article on elections in Iran, U.S.-based sociologist Ahmad Sadri says that although Iran may not be a liberal democracy, it is "a representative democracy grafted onto a theocracy." Referring to the Islamic Republic as "a unique specimen," he predicts an emergence of a stronger democracy in Iran, and in one scenario, "the increasing ceremonialization of theocracy," which he considers likely if radical destabilization in the country is to be avoided.

Perhaps by then, the response Kazantzakis gave to his critics in the church may also be heeded by the powers that be in Iran: "You gave me a curse, holy fathers, I give you a blessing: May your conscience be as clear as mine and may you be as moral and religious as I."
Michalis Firillas
9 May, 2008

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/981961.html

Olmert’s in trouble with the law, again. So what?

2008-05-04T02:54:00.015+03:00

If you ask any Israeli whether they think their Prime Minister is a crook, they will nod in agreement. In fact, some may even boast that ‘he is pretty good at it.’ Having weathered four police investigations into possible corruption, cronyism, bribery, and a series of other white collar offenses, and survived a long, albeit erratic probe into the Second Lebanon War, Ehud Olmert also developed a reputation for being a political Houdini. Indeed, after two years in power, since his 2006 election victory, it seemed that he had managed to beat the odds. And then, WHAM! Headlines Friday read that he had been urgently summoned by police for what appeared to be yet another probe into alleged bribery charges.

No one really knows what is going on. Actually, that is not exactly true: police and Justice officials know, as does Olmert – but there is a gag order, which is part and parcel of a rather silly, anachronistic legal philosophy that seems to pervade the Israeli legal system. Israel being a small country, it is only a matter of time before its unruly media will crack and leak details of the case – without attribution, off course. (See, the piece on the Fourth Estate in Israel). The common practice of secret sources means that the Israeli public will be bombarded with leaks from the police, prosecution, various politicians and the Prime Minister and his cronies for at least a couple of weeks before the gag order is lifted, at which point we will all have made up our minds about the case, rather than be given a serious opportunity to form an opinion based on a more or less objective method. Good thing there is no 'jury of your peers' system in Israel. It would be hard to find anyone who has not formed an opinion on your case, not to mention anyone admitting to be your peer.

What we think we know is that a wealthy foreign Jewish businessman allegedly paid Olmert large sums before he was Prime Minister – possibly when he served as Vice Premier and Minister of Industry and Trade in the government of Ariel Sharon, and maybe even earlier, when he was Jerusalem Mayor. The rush for an interview stemmed from two main reasons: it turns out that the businessman had been interviewed by police while on a visit to Israel recently, and probably cooperated with the investigators; and the investigators feared that as soon as Olmert and others involved in the case learned of this, an effort to scuttle the probe would be under way, first and foremost by coordinating their versions of the story.

Now the police say they have solid evidence against Olmert. If nothing stuck to the man until now, they seem to be confident that they have something that will. Reactions are mixed: the Israeli public is fed up but traditionally fickle; politicians are cautious but getting ready to pounce; the press is sharpening its pen knives; and Olmert is hoping the next 72 hours pass quickly. He was hoping to bask in the glory of the next week’s 60th Independence Day celebrations, with a line of foreign dignitaries arriving to pay tribute to Israel’s success story. Instead, everyone is on edge.

Pundits have already began writing about a ‘critical mass’ (as if Olmert was some nuclear experiment) of pressure that the Prime Minister will not be able to bear this time. One scenario has the details of the story leaking and the politicians and the press pounding on Olmert for the fifth time in less than two years. Everyone seems to be betting that no one in Israel can be that lucky - to survive five police investigations. They say that Labor Chairman and coalition partner, Ehud Barak will falter and threaten to quit the coalition unless Olmert steps down. That can be risky because infighting in Olmert’s Kadima party may result in a coalition implosion and new elections sooner than next year. No one in the coalition wants elections they know they cannot win. Barak already faces stern opposition in his own party. Only last week it was leaked out that there was more than shouting and shoving at a closed party meeting. Benjamin Netanyahu is lurking in the sidelines, waiting for an opportunity only he can possibly miss. And the Israeli public: with the price of rice rising, they just want to be left alone. Indeed, during the past year or so, the Israeli public appears to be a little tired of all the excitement – they have gotten used to the drone of low intensity warfare in the Gaza Strip, stable prices, low unemployment, even a government that is led by a crook, but whom they recognize to be their own. They don't want any surprises.

So what now? If this investigation gets serious – and the police and prosecution have something to hold onto, it would not be at all surprising if we saw progress in one of the following arenas:

a. a deal with Hamas for the release of the abducted soldier Gilad Shalit. It is almost a done deal anyway: both sides know the price: about 1,300 to 1, give or take a few hundred. Hamas will get its prisoners released and Olmert will be a hero with Shalit coming home. Added to that, some sort of cease-fire will be signed and a new deal on how the crossings into the Gaza Strip would be run, will be ironed out.

b. direct talks with the Syrians, possibly with the tacit blessing of G.W. Bush, who is a big fan of Olmert and is on his way to the Holy Land next week. Bush is on his way out anyway, so Olmert, stuck between a rock (police probe) and a hard place (the waning Bush era) may decide the latter is worth annoying if it means popularity at home.

c. some sort of major military operation. This is not likely at this stage unless Hamas (or a smaller Gaza based militia) or Hezbollah do something particularly silly, and give Olmert and Barak an opportunity to take up an option they both saved for a particularly rainy day – in Israeli politics.

If they had bookies in Israel at every street corner, as they do in ‘civilized’ places like Britain or Cyprus, it is a fair chance that we would know the odds on Olmert’s political future by tomorrow. Those guys are not known for making many mistakes. But Olmert has proven to be a difficult politician to write off, and it seems like we have been down this path already – remember Sharon, the investigations against him, and the Gaza evacuation? Maybe one of Olmert's closest advisers, Vice Premier Haim Ramon, will be able to cook up another coup on the Arab-Israeli front. Anything to keep Bibi Netanyahu and Udi Barak at bay.

Michalis Firillas

4 May, 2008

Understanding the Holocaust

2008-04-30T22:56:00.010+03:00

Today is Holocaust Memorial Day in Israel.

I did not always understand the enormity of the crime. It has been a gradual understanding, over the three decades of connection with the Jewish people, paralleling my development from childhood to adulthood. The things a child sees are different from what an adult chooses to notice – they are less political.

I had heard of the Holocaust for the first time when I was seven. At that time I heard adults talking of a very curious, terrifying phenomenon: soap made of humans. I was too scared to ask for details, but I heard the word Jews, and Hitler was mentioned too, both alien words to me.

But I still had not made the connection between Jews and the Holocaust. I had heard the word used to describe terrible results of battle, of scorched corpses of national heroes. For a young Greek child the word was one of horror, of absolute catastrophe and brilliant, destructive fires. Then in early 1978 I read in a magazine of an attack on a bus in which many Jews were killed in a huge blaze. It was described in the article as a ‘holocaust.’ I was beginning to put together a picture of Jews as victims of fire.

Our first home in Israel was in the northern town of Nahariya. On the road to town stood a large building, a museum, where I was told ‘human soap’ was housed. For years, every time I passed by that building, I tried not to think about it. And when they talked about the Holocaust in school, I tried not to make the connection to that building. Instead I tried to focus on the name of the kibbutz where the museum was kept – and we were encouraged to think of its meaning: Lohamei HaGetaot (Ghetto Fighters). Somehow it made the horrors I imagined – because I still did not really know – seem acceptable. I rationalized it had been a battle, a war, full of glory and the death of heroes.

Over the years the narrative of heroism, victimhood, suffering and liberation, were not readily distinguishable to me. The order and proximity in which three days of commemoration fall, create a sense of historical order: Holocaust memorial is followed a week later by the memorial for the fallen soldiers of Israel, and immediately after by Independence Day celebrations. It is hard to miss the progression: we were persecuted for being Jews; we shed much blood to gain our independence; now we have a Jewish state. At a much later date, I also came to see an ominous warning in the progression: our lesson is that we will never again allow another Holocaust on our people – be warned.

The real change for me, when I began to put it all together - the horror, the enormity, the narratives, the inhumanity and the perseverance - happened when I went to the neighborhood store one day. The owner, a nice little old man who looked a bit like Yoda - Mr. Katz was his name - normally had long sleeved shirts on. One summer day even he succumbed to the heat wave. A barely discernible smudge on his arm, somewhere in the wrinkled old skin, stood out as he reached out to give me change. Mesmerized I stared and realized it was a number.

To me, the number came to symbolize the uniqueness of the Holocaust. It was no longer just genocide; it was something else, something for which I am still short of words. In retrospect I think that the number on the arm of Mr. Katz shocked me because it made him definitively unheroic. It stripped him of his identity, of his individualism as a human being. It encapsulated everything that organized extermination was about. The sort of killing that targets people without pathos, without feeling and afterthought: a mechanical, calculated massacre, with the kind of distance between victim and perpetrator that makes it seem almost banal.

Over the years I have had much criticism for the State of Israel. But, as time passed and I came to understand the Holocaust better, the more I realized that there are many out there who still do not fathom its horror, its uniqueness and its significance. This only strengthened my conviction in the need for a Jewish State. Indeed, I was not always a Zionist. But vitriol, hatred and ignorance of the sort uttered regularly by the likes of Iran’s President, Hezbollah’s leader and Hamas, have made me one. Their raw anti-Semitism, and its echoes around the world have led me to draw a red line: I can no longer imagine continued Jewish existence without the State of Israel.

I will continue criticizing Israel where I think it deserves it. And I will continue challenging the victorious, linear narratives of Jewish fanatics. The Holocaust does not make Jews or Israel infallible. Nor did the Holocaust alone make Israel – that is post-colonial gibberish of hateful extremists. But so long as there are those out there dreaming of another Holocaust, I know whose side I am on.
Michalis Firillas
30 April, 2008

Courage and History

2008-04-24T13:57:00.012+03:00

This article originally appeared in Haaretz on 25 October, 2007. I post it now on the date commemorating the Armenian Genocide.

Nations are measured by their history. But we often forget that they are also measured by the way they confront their history. This can be a difficult task, requiring courage, vision and commitment to a different future. It demands more honesty and less pride. It makes a distinction between dignity and shame - and knows how to enhance the former and address the latter. And it requires the involvement of both the political leadership, on the one hand, and the individual citizen, on the other.

Which brings us to the following question: What can we learn from the German response to the Holocaust that might help Turkey alter its attitude toward the Armenian genocide? A loaded question? Obviously. An unfair one? Maybe. But is it a useful one? Definitely, and not only for the Turks. If there is one lesson we must have picked up on during the 20th century, it is that we are all "built" for genocide. There is no culture, polity, community that is immune from this. There are of course many ways of carrying out genocide. You can starve your victims, parch them, march them into the desert, shoot them, rape them, gas them, burn them, bomb them, hack them to pieces. You do not need to be an industrial powerhouse to do it quickly, efficiently. And by most standards, there is at least one genocide taking place right now, in East Africa.

Mentioning Turkey in the same sentence as the Holocaust is anathema to all Turks - and they are right because it is a horrific stigma to bear. "Placing the Turks in the same category as Nazis is intolerable to us," one Turkish official was quoted as saying in The Economist on October 4. But that is missing the point. This is not about comparative genocide - an exercise that invariably devolves into some form of bean counting. But when a state refuses to acknowledge history, it affects the psyche of the nation, perpetuating stasis, first on a moral level and then in every other aspect of life.

When World War II came to an end in Europe, in May 1945, the crimes of Germany were exposed before the world. The horror was such that for a while there were American officials who sought to reduce Germany to an agrarian society so that it could never again perpetrate such criminal aggression.

Things turned out differently, in great part because of Cold War exigencies. But at least in West Germany, a concerted effort was made by its political leadership - and first and foremost by Konrad Adenauer, the country's first chancellor - to restore Germany to the community of nations, foremost through the acknowledgment of the past. Not only did Germany accept responsibility, but it actively sought to preserve that diabolical chapter in its history - in the memory of the state and of every single German citizen.

It can be argued that the Germans were forced into accepting responsibility. They were occupied, crushed, starving, shocked and shamed. All true. But they did take responsibility, with the understanding that they could not escape history and that if they could muster the courage, they could use that experience to build a better future.

Such a tack requires leadership. And the epitome of Adenauer's leadership came with the reconciliation between West Germany and Israel, which began formally in 1952, with the signing of the reparations agreement. This also required a great deal of courage and leadership on the part of David Ben-Gurion, who pushed that accord through in the face of great opposition at home. It did not mean forgiveness by any means. But it was the start of reconciliation, and that is what genuine leaders owe to the future generations of their people.

Turkey's circumstances are different from those of Germany, and so is its historical development. But finding excuses is always easier than doing what is right. Yes, Turkey has simultaneously struggled with at least three massive challenges since its establishment in 1923, the roots of which dated back to the great reforms started in 1839: building a nation-state; modernization; and democratization. By the time Germany perpetrated the Holocaust, it had gone through all these stages, with greater or lesser success. Indeed, apologists are always quick to point out that "this is not a good time" for Turkey to address the Armenian issue. The bottom line is that it is never a good time: There is always some crisis brewing, some hyper-sensitive general, politician or group, too many other things going on. That is the nature of the mix that makes Turkey what it is.

However, all too often the Turkish people are underestimated. This is more frequently done by its own leaders than by foreigners. When Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declares that "there was no Armenian genocide," that is precisely what he is doing: underestimating his people, and their ability to look forward and acknowledge mistakes. For the leader of a party whose popularity stems from the desire of many Turks to remove the shackles of a traditionally paternalistic state - this is no way to usher in change. History is not solely the domain of historians, as Erdogan and others would have us believe. Every Turk has a role in the making of Turkish history, and a stake in the making of Turkey's future. Recognizing past wrongs and calling them by name is difficult, and may even seem insurmountable, but the Turks must find the courage to try to do so.
Michalis Firillas

25 October 2007

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/914666.html

Frustration in the Middle East (part one): Israel

2008-04-21T14:11:00.009+03:00

To say that the Middle East is a frustrating place would be an understatement. But last week, we may have witnessed a new low in the pathetic way the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflict are being managed, which signaled that perhaps neither side really wants the conflict to end. Either everyone seems to think that time is on their side or they are too busy worrying about staying in power to do anything to change the situation.

It all began with a visit to the region by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, which stirred up so much angst in Israel’s leadership that one would think that the Nobel Peace Laureate was what the security services in Israel euphemistically refer to as a ‘ticking bomb’ – an imminent terrorist attack. Not only was Carter shunned by anyone in Israel's political leadership that counts – first and foremost Prime Minister Ehud Olmert – but he was also ridiculed, insulted and treated in a way that should embarrass every Israeli. Carter’s latest crime against Israel: he wants to talk to Hamas.

It is no secret that many Israelis and friends of Israel abroad consider Carter to be, at best, antagonistic to Israel; some would even go as far as to call him anti-Semitic. Most think he is a do-gooder Israel does not need; a straight shooter who shoots mostly at Israel; a fanatic for peace and dialogue that is willing even to talk to Satan himself, if he thought it would bring peace. His book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, sealed Carter’s fate in the minds of many Israelis and supporters abroad. Anytime you put the words ‘Palestine’ and ‘Apartheid’ within several miles of each other, Israel’s air defenses go on high alert looking for Carter, slicing through the ether in his cape of peace.

Whether Carter is a crackpot or not, he deserves the respect a former U.S. President who has done a great deal to bring peace to the Middle East, warrants. This means that Olmert, whose behavior toward Carter was unbecoming a Prime Minister, should have received him, nodded politely, and if he wished, forget what he had been told as soon as his octogenarian visitor stepped out. Carter is the perfect interlocutor with organizations like Hamas, and regimes like that of Iran. He is a former U.S. President, which means he has both no official role, but nonetheless his former status and Secret Service detail means he is no lightweight. In other words, he serves everyone’s purpose, without strings attached. Which makes the arguments of some of Olmert’s aides, who argued that meeting with Carter would ‘legitimize’ the idea of talks with Hamas, ludicrous.

Every single day Israeli generals, former generals, generals who want to be politicians, and politicians who want to be generals, get on the air and remind us that the only solution to the situation in the Gaza Strip is a ‘deep,’ ‘thorough,’ ‘crushing’ blow against Hamas. This would, of course, require a massive ground incursion into the Gaza Strip, which every one knows is something the Israeli leadership will agree to do only if domestic pressure becomes impossible to bear (i.e. the kind of pressure that threatens the prime minister’s hold on his post). The irony of this is that those same advocates of the kind of ‘offensive’ that persons like Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz called for on Israel Radio this morning, know that not only will the cost in Israeli lives be terrible, but that it will return Israel to the same Gaza Strip it left in 2005 – in other words, to reoccupying at least 1.5 million Palestinian civilians and assuming direct responsibility for their welfare.

It is an unfortunate fact that the current Israeli government, and probably subsequent governments, will not be able to offer a solution to the Gaza Strip conundrum. This is so for two reasons: Hamas is perceived by Israel to be both a regional and a domestic problem; and Israel is unwilling to achieve real progress with the Palestinian Authority, for domestic reasons, but also because it recognizes that without Hamas there can be no real two state solution.

If it is impossible to move forward and offer a practical solution to the Gaza Strip, either because Israel and the current U.S. administration are unwilling to talk with Hamas (in great part with the blessing of PA’s Mahmoud Abbas), or because Israel is unwilling to reoccupy the territory, then it is high time to listen to those who have called for a long-term cease-fire with Hamas. This would entail a prisoner exchange and a series of other agreements that would regulate and supervise the use of the crossing points on the borders of the Gaza Strip with Egypt and with Israel. Possibly it would also require the deployment of an international force, although Israel is reluctant. In any case, the cease fire would serve to buy time for genuine progress in Israel-PA and PA-Hamas talks. Hopefully this will also allow sufficient time to bolster PA security, economic and political organs that would allow a properly working state mechanism to take root.

In the mean time, it is worthwhile to comprehend that people like Jimmy Carter are not the problem. Track II talks have been around for a while and they have been important in some breakthroughs in the conflict in the Middle East (Oslo comes to mind), but have also contributed to open dialogue and encouraged the development of civil society in the region. Whether or not Carter’s drive and conviction annoys many friends of Israel, he is no anti-Semite, and he is also no fool. He knows precisely who the dictators he so often meets with are (something commentators have recently slammed him on) and he is no pacifist. As for the bit about apartheid, here is a recent statement made by Ehud Olmert, in an interview to Haaretz the day after the Annapolis summit (Nov. 2007): "If the day comes when the two-state solution collapses, and we face a South African-style struggle for equal voting rights (also for the Palestinians in the territories), then, as soon as that happens, the State of Israel is finished." Maybe apartheid is an overly loaded term – but if Olmert can see what is on the horizon, many others for whom Israel is dear can too.
Michalis Firillas
21 April, 2008

Let the West be One: Why the western alliance is needed more than ever

2008-04-18T23:31:00.016+03:00

This article first appeared in Haaretz on 18 April, 2008.

The Western alliance has been a fractious affair at the best of times. That's hardly surprising. In an alliance of democracies, where domestic politics actively shape foreign policy, and free market economies, where competition is the norm, serious disagreements are to be expected. But when one adds to the blend satiated (some would say "fat"), aging, jaded societies that are increasingly reluctant to accept the concept of sacrifice, the question of the alliance's ability to be effective becomes a real concern.

There are many who would argue that the nearly eight years of the Bush administration have shown the Western alliance at both its best and its worst. Following the 9/11 attacks, the alliance was at the peak of cohesion, activating Article 5 of the NATO charter - by which the organization is mobilized in defense of a member state under attack - for the first time since its establishment

in 1949. But following the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the alliance began to show cracks, with Iraq becoming a veritable fault line - as the Bush administration opted increasingly to go it alone. Most recently, the question of relations with Russia returned to the fore, with Washington seemingly ready to risk the possibility of a renewed cold war in Europe. The decision at NATO's Bucharest Summit, earlier this month, not to invite Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance right now signaled a failure for the Bush administration, and perhaps even the end to a period in which NATO expansion eastward was considered an effective tool of democratization and stability.

The past eight years of tumult within the alliance have given many critics plenty of ammunition to decry NATO's relevance. Moreover, the unilateralism of the Bush administration has aggravated one of the thorniest and most sensitive issues for all alliances: equality among members. Even though it is historically not unusual for alliances to be centered around a major power, the Western alliance is anything but normative: It has managed to survive nearly 60 years, in part because of unparalleled consensus; and has contributed to and coexisted with the emergence of an alliance of European democracies − the European Union. As such, not only has the longevity of the alliance meant that member states have changed considerably since the early years, but the emergence of the EU has created rival institutions to NATO, and increasingly a sense that the Western alliance should come to represent a more equal cooperation between two large units - the U.S. and the EU.

This requires significant shifts in mindsets, both in Washington and in European capitals: Foreign policy and security priorities must be assessed differently, with broader interests in mind, and at the same time contributions and capabilities in personnel and hardware must be more readily forthcoming. When one adds to this equation the fact that not all European members of NATO are EU members - with Turkey, in particular, embodying complexities that go beyond issues of security - it is not difficult to appreciate the confusion that surrounds the Western alliance at this time.

Whether hardcore realist, or ardent idealist, anyone who believes in the idea of the West must also wish to see the alliance continue, and encourage its transformation into a more cohesive, effective force. At this particular juncture in history there are some basic facts that necessitate a very frank approach. For many in the non-Western world, the West represents a destination, a target, a dream and a future. However much Westerners criticize the way they have lived - and there is plenty to scorn - during the past 60 years, the West has offered a safe haven for the oppressed, a future for immigrants, a beacon of hope for those enslaved. It has offered economic opportunity, shared knowledge, open gates to newcomers seeking a better tomorrow, all because concepts of human rights, respect for individual freedoms, and free, unhindered dialogue are respected, protected, cherished values. The collective role of the Western alliance in maintaining these values should not be downplayed.

Furthermore, for the first time in the post-1945 era, there are real and immediate crises around the world that transcend boundaries and whose nature is only partially military. For example, in recent weeks, there have been statements by senior officials of the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, and elsewhere, pointing to a grave crisis in the availability of food, and warning that scarcity at such critical levels may lead to wars. Even the most skeptical student of history will be tempted to draw parallels to the Roman Empire in the 3rd-5th centuries C.E., besieged by hungry tribes seeking refuge from marauding invaders in the steppes, or worse, climatic changes that devastated their crops and hunting grounds.

It is doubtful whether a "Fortress West" mentality is the answer in a world whose countries are increasingly interlinked, but it is also clear that the West will have to play an increasingly active role, both at its borders and in more distant lands, if it is to preserve its shared interests and values, and also help others survive in increasingly difficult natural and political circumstances. Similarly, if crises like Darfur − a Western failure par excellence − are not to become increasingly common, the Western alliance must undergo the necessary changes to become more effective and its governments must find the wherewithal for the sacrifices this requires.

Michalis Firillas

18 April, 2008

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/976271.html

Don't forget the basics: Why Turkey must be directly involved in the talks

2008-04-17T15:27:00.010+03:00

This article first appeared on 17 April, 2008 in In Depth, a bimonthly electronic newsletter of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, which is affiliated with the University of Nicosia.

Watching the fanfare in the media, particularly the foreign press, it is hard not to get caught up in the spirit of ‘change.’ As if to bolster the argument against the skeptics, there is progress to show: Ledra Street underwent a historic change with its opening to traffic between the two sides of Nicosia; and the chief negotiators of the two communities have nearly completed the list of 13 subjects that working teams will negotiate. In light of the short period after the election of Demetris Christofias to the Presidency that these developments occurred, this is undoubtedly progress. But for many Greek Cypriots, and veteran observers of developments in Cyprus, there is something fundamental that is missing: the issue of occupation.

Since the early 1980s the issue of the Turkish occupation of the northern third of the island and Ankara’s central role in altering ‘facts on the ground’ in Cyprus has been systematically pushed to the bottom of the agenda. For much of the period after the 1977 agreements on a bizonal federation, and until he stepped down in 2005, the focus of much of the negotiating efforts centered on ways to soften the intransigence of the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. The decades focused on Denktash contributed to an illusion that essentially, and one might add conveniently for certain parties, diverted attention from the basic fact that Turkey and its army were at the crux of the imposed changes on the Cypriot population.

While it is of utmost importance to hold bicommunal talks on a workable settlement to the internal dispute on the island, it is paramount that the issue of Turkish occupation of Cypriot sovereign territory be dealt with in parallel. There are three central reasons for this.

First, it is almost comical to pretend that the self-declared Turkish Cypriot statelet is anything but a creation of Ankara and a direct expression of Turkey’s efforts to irretrievably alter historical conditions on the ground, contravening agreements to which Ankara is signatory.

Second, Turkey has exclusive say on security issues over the territory of Cyprus it controls and over the Turkish Cypriot community; occasionally Ankara also seeks to extent that influence over all parts of Cyprus and beyond it. Most recently this occurred in relation to plans for offshore oil and gas exploration in an area to the southwest of the island.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, Turkey links Cyprus to many of its broader strategic goals and fluctuations in these affect Ankara’s attitudes in Cyprus. Thus, its relations with the European Union, its territorial claims in the Aegean, and its ambitions of influence in the Balkans, all affect its approach in Cyprus. Turkey’s European ambitions have already been integrated into the 2004 Annan Plan and it is hard to imagine how it will be possible to decouple this issue from any future solution in Cyprus.

Had Ankara merely retained troops on the island as a safeguard of an interim status quo, until territorial and constitutional agreements were reached between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, then perhaps the issue of Turkish role in Cyprus could have been left on the back burner. But Ankara is actively working to delegitimize the Republic of Cyprus, whose establishment it backed, whose constitutional status quo it claimed to seek to restore by its invasion, and whose territorial integrity it guarantees (at least on paper). Similarly, Ankara has consistently and aggressively Turkified the Turkish Cypriot community, by an infusion of tens of thousands of immigrants from mainland Turkey. How then is it possible to negotiate solely on the bicommunal level, ignoring the dominant role that Ankara plays on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, as well at their expense?

Turkey has consistently avoided direct negotiations with the Greek Cypriots and has been insufficiently pressed to partake in these. In part this stems from the same patronizing attitude which dominates Ankara’s relationship with the Turkish Cypriots, and also by extension an effort to reassert an imperial mantle over the entire island. But it is also part of a concerted effort to skirt its responsibilities, its violations of fundamentals of international law, and its wish to legitimize a post-1974 fait accompli.

While not many Greek Cypriots still believe that Cyprus can be restored to a 1974 ante status quo, any resolution to the Cyprus question involves Turkey, and it is important to pursue a parallel effort that would bring Turkey directly into the negotiations. All leverage should be brought to bear in this effort, not least of which should be a public relations campaign among decision makers in European capitals but also in Washington. However, ultimately, by restoring the basics to the negotiating table, the Greek Cypriots will be able to gauge Ankara’s reaction to any developments in talks with the Turkish Cypriots. Let’s call it a litmus test to Turkey’s real intent.

Michalis Firillas

17 April, 2008

http://www.cceia.unic.ac.cy/newsletter/articles/volume5_issue2

The final NATO summit of President George Bush

2008-04-01T21:42:00.010+03:00

A version of this analysis was published in the Hebrew Print Edition of Haaretz on 2 April, 2008.

NATO summits are unique in that they occur at important junctures in the alliance's future. Indeed, the organization itself describes them as serving to “address issues of overarching political or strategic importance.” The Bucharest summit will do just that, with particular focus on further NATO expansion and the role its forces could play in missions, like Afghanistan and Kosovo. And even though it is not discussed openly, underlying this final summit for President George Bush, is the role his administration has played in furthering policies that many critics have described as ‘divisive’ for the alliance.

Arguably, no American president ever started his relationship with NATO with such promise only for it to culminate in divisions that have led some observers to openly question the alliance's future relevance. For the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter in response to 9/11, mobilizing the alliance in the defense of a member state. But since the early days of the war on terror, consensus within the alliance frayed as the Bush administration became increasingly unilateralist in its approach. Not only did veteran NATO members grow critical of Bush's policies in Iraq, but most of those who did commit troops to missions, like Afghanistan, became reluctant to authorize the deployment of their forces in areas of heavy fighting. Most recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized allies like Germany, for what he described as their unwillingness to fight, which he said is creating a two-tier alliance.

If the unilateralism of the Bush administration ruffled the feathers of some of more established members, it did not deter the new members, countries of the former Warsaw Pact. For yet other countries, particularly from the Balkans, but also states like Ukraine and Georgia, contributing to the U.S.-led operations abroad came to be regarded as a ticket to future membership. Indeed, Bush is now pushing hard to include Ukraine and Georgia in NATO. Not only is Russia strongly opposed to any such possibility, which will bring the NATO alliance even closer to its territory, but France and Germany are also against the move, worried that it may threaten European-Russian relations and have immediate consequences on energy supplies.

But if there is something that encapsulates the Bush administration's willingness to approach European security issues unilaterally, as it takes advantage of its relative popularity among former Soviet satellites, it is the missile defense system Washington is negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic. Russian reaction has been fierce, threatening to target capitals of the alliance with nuclear weapons. Not only in Paris and Berlin, but at NATO's Brussels headquarters too, the notion that the U.S. was independently negotiating the deployment of a missile defense system drew strong criticism. In any case, the issue is still pending, with Warsaw and Prague playing hard ball with Washington, hoping for a better package of benefits.

However, not all is bleak when looking at the Bush 'imprint' on the alliance. The new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, whose declared admiration for America had drawn criticism at home, has said that he would like to see France return to NATO's joint command structure, and promised French combat troops for Afghanistan. This summit will also usher in two new members – Albania and Croatia – and if the dispute over Macedonia's name is resolved, it too will join the alliance. These are countries eager to toe the American line in return for investment opportunities and help in upgrading their military capabilities.

It is important to remember that NATO, in spite its shortcomings, has succeeded as an alliance since 1949 because it is based on consensus. A great part of that consensus relies on the belief of all member states that it is better to be in the alliance than out of it – and for this they are willing to compromise. As such, even an administration as divisive and uncompromising as that of George Bush is not likely to leave an indelible mark on the alliance – which may mean that NATO will continue its slow evolution, from a Cold War alliance to a catalyst for peace.

Michalis Firillas

1 April, 2008

Arab League (part one): Go to Jerusalem

2008-03-31T15:50:00.007+03:00

Anyone with children or siblings would recognize the scene: mutual recrimination, mocking expressions, and sometimes a little tussle here and there. No, this is not another classic episode of Roseanne, that show from the late 80s which established the format for other dysfunctional families on television. It is yet another Arab League summit.

But this particular summit, which began yesterday in Damascus, may qualify as a challenger for the prize for worst possible. Even by the high standards of Arab League melodrama and disunity, the Damascus 2008 summit is disturbingly problematic. Indeed, it could be argued that this summit may have marked a new nadir in Arab disunity, of the sort achieved in the early 1980s when Egypt, a founding member and leading force of the organization was boycotted for its decision to sign a separate peace agreement with Israel.

Only 12 of the 22 members of the League were represented at the summit by their respective heads of state. Lebanon boycotted the summit, while Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, leading members of the organization, sent low level officials to the Syrian capital. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister went further and said Damascus should be ‘punished’ for its meddling in Lebanese politics and for foiling an agreement that would resolve the political crisis that has plagued the country for more than a year.

The Syrians tried to keep up a façade of calm, insisting that that in spite all pressures, and a full-court-press by the U.S., in place since the Damascus was included in the axis of evil by President George Bush, they have managed to host a respectable League summit. They also took a jab at the Saudis by pointing out that in spite their criticism of close ties between Damascus and Tehran, ‘at least we didn’t invite a Persian to an Arab summit,’ reference to Riyadh’s invitation of Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Gulf Cooperation Council conference in 2007.

The infighting within the Arab world over the role and inroads Iran is making, either in Lebanon, Iraq, the Gaza Strip and elsewhere, is not likely to be resolved any time soon, and we are in for more rounds of similar displays of disunity in the coming months. But one of the more troubling aspects of this summit is the support for a threat to rescind the Arab initiative of 2002, which offered Israel peace and normalization in return for a pullout of territory occupied since 1967. The deal includes a few other conditions, most importantly from Israel’s point of view, of a call for a negotiated agreement on the return of Palestinian refugees. The firebrand Secretary General of the League, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, said that a decision was made “to evaluate and review Arab strategies and the plan of action regarding reviving the peace process.” This review is set to begin sometime in the middle of this year. A similar decision was reached by Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo three weeks ago.

Let’s acknowledge from the onset that Israel is no saint. There is no point in detailing here the shortcomings of its policies, or lack thereof, over the years. The point is that plenty of time was wasted and conscious decisions were made, for domestic political reasons, to avoid taking courageous and substantive steps toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, notwithstanding terrorism and violence. But it should also be said that the Arab League initiative is only half-impressive. Its formula is well known and it comes down to ‘land for peace.’ That is not good enough.

If the Arab League really wants to leave its mark in history, and does believe that adhering to international law is critical to resolving the conflict, then it needs to do something truly impressive. All 22 heads of state should go to Jerusalem as a group, pray at Al-Aqsa mosque, and visit the Knesset. And there they should declare that they recognize Israel’s right to exist within the 4 June 1967 borders, in line with the same United Nations decision to support the partition of Palestine and the 1949 armistice agreements. Of course, they should also take the opportunity to remind the Israelis that if they want normalization, peace, diplomatic missions, etc., they need to relinquish all occupied territory, allow the establishment of a Palestinian state, and assist it to become a viable, livable country. Moreover, they should also tell Israel that this historic visit does not mean diplomatic recognition, but it means historical reconciliation with the partition of Palestine and the rejection of plans, practical or imaginary, to destroy Israel.

In the next segment of this entry, I will explain to the skeptics why this seemingly impossible act of unity and symbolism on the part of the Arab League is not only doable but urgently necessary at this time.

Michalis Firillas

31 March, 2008

Olympian politics – the continuation of war by other means

2008-03-25T01:03:00.008+02:00

The lighting of the Olympic flame is a religious affair. The reenactment of the ancient ceremony is meant to symbolize both the eternal spirit of humanity and our collective belief in peace, shared values, and fair competition. Presumably it is the belief in the sanctity of the games that has led western leaders to call on keeping politics out of the 29th Olympiad, fending off calls for a boycott by democracies of China’s crowning moment. Unfortunately, if the dictators in Beijing remain steadfast in their refusal to recognize that things are changing – including inside the borders of China – it will become increasingly difficult for western leaders to ignore the calls for greater freedom for oppressed minorities there.

The argument that politics and sport do not mix is flawed at its root. The ancient games were all about politics and city-state pride. Recognizing them as a celebration for all Greeks, the city-states would call off war for their duration and would laud their victors as symbols of the superiority of their city. Sometimes, as legend has it, the city state would raze some of its fortifications as a symbol of its invincibility. When Theodosius I banned the Olympic games in 394 AD, he did so for politics – deeming the games pagan in what was by now a Christian Roman Empire.

Since the modern games were inaugurated in 1896, politics intervened on a number of occasions. Most famously the games became political at the Berlin games in 1936, briefly in Mexico City in 1968, at the Munich Olympics in 1972, in Moscow and Los Angeles, in 1980 and 1984 respectively. As the 2008 summer games approach we will witness an increasingly intensifying campaign by activists, which will not leave governments in the west unaffected, and will likely transform the Beijing Olympiad into a highly political affair.

There is nothing wrong with mixing politics and sport. The United States is an oddity in this respect, because its professional sports franchises are apolitical. Republicans and Democrats alike, Americans of all races, religions and creeds, support the same sports team. European soccer was never apolitical – even though there is growing tendency to distort the lines between political identity and commercial interests with the emergence and success of the Champions League. But for most of the past century, clubs in many countries in the world have been identified with the right or the left sides of the political spectrum, with the haves or the have-nots, with the fascists or the communists.

The modern Olympics too have always been political – both in the way the nation-state adopts them as symbols of its achievement and national pride, but also in the way they are awarded. Recently there was also a question raised about the way Kosovo would be represented in the Olympics, since it is a state that the United Nations does not yet recognize. For that there may be solutions – including letting Kosovar athletes march behind the rest of the national flags parading during the opening ceremony. But what does need to be resolved is the question of awarding the games to totalitarian regimes – especially in the post-Cold War era. Should China have been awarded the games in the first place, in view of its dismal human rights record?

Despotic regimes recognize full well the public relations value of displaying their might, be it in military parades or in the number of gold medals accumulated by its robotic athletes. Even the most liberal among us note the medal count, and for smaller states any medal is a source of national pride - of collective achievement. For regimes like the one in Beijing, Mussolini’s Italy during the soccer World Cup in 1934, Hitler’s Germany in 1936, or the Soviets in 1980, the international focus on them and their regime is part of an orchestrated show of their system’s superiority. The international community should cease collaborating with such regimes.

The arguments made that, for example, the thousands of reporters who will flood Beijing will also expose the shortcomings of the Chinese state are insufficient. Western governments should pressure Beijing to speed up reforms in matters that are not solely economic – including matters pertaining to the rights of workers and improved living standards for the millions of Chinese citizens who are not benefiting from the capitalist windfall. And, the western leadership should not shy from spoiling Beijing’s party: athletes should wear armbands expressing their opposition to the oppression of minorities and dissidents in China, and heads of state should not participate in the opening or closing ceremonies. Maybe then Beijing will begin to appreciate the true Olympic spirit.
Michalis Firillas
25 March, 2008

U.S. crashes - China breaks

2008-03-21T22:24:00.005+02:00

This article originally appeared in Haaretz on 21 March, 2008.

News from America is bleak. Earlier this week the Federal Reserve came to the rescue and backed a deal for the sale of a paragon of Wall Street culture, Bear Stearns, to JP Morgan Chase, for a mere $2 per share. Lehman Brothers, another major investment bank, was also felt to be tottering. Responding to the crisis of liquidity - the availability of money for banks to loan, primarily to other smaller banks and then on to Joe in the street - the Fed dropped the rate by a further 0.75 percent. After weeks of dire financial instability, and months of efforts by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke to stem the downward spiral sparked by the subprime collapse, mostly by repeated cuts in the interest rate, the question on everyone's lips is one of anticipation: How long will this go on? Perhaps they should also be asking, "How much worse can this get?"

Even the most optimistic forecasts do not exclude the possibility that a recession, or worse, stagflation (high prices on top of no jobs), will go on for many months. Realists will also tell you that unless the legacy of former Fed chief Alan Greenspan, primarily of averting recession by adding cash to the economy through interest-rate manipulation and lax lending regulation, is adjusted to the current international conditions, we are all in for lean times. The condition of the number one economy in the world will obviously affect the rest of the world. But as you watch America tumble into what may be the biggest economic crisis since World War II, from an international perspective, China is the one to keep an eye on.

Let's state the obvious: China is the world's most populous country; on average its economy is the fastest-growing one in Asia; its economy is a mixed bag of reforms and strict state controls; and it is not a democracy. Managing this problematic combination of factors is a complex task to say the least, but more important, it is not something that can go on indefinitely. Moreover, these factors have also contributed to three parallel processes that have matured and are now converging in China at this critical juncture, when the American economy is in a downward spin. The impact of this convergence may mean that the biggest domino in the world economy will also fall over, and this is a crash that will not only be heard around the world, but may also turn bloody.

The first process is the enrichment of China. The opening of the Chinese economy to foreign investment made it part of the global capitalist economy, bringing in billions of dollars from exports of consumer goods and contributing to the emergence of a middle class. The insatiable hunger of the developed world, particularly the United States, for inexpensive Made in China products transformed the country into what is essentially a lender of money. China has the largest foreign reserves in the world, estimated at a staggering $1.4 trillion dollars, nearly 70 percent of which is held in U.S. dollars. Even with the gradual, yet significant, adjustments of the yuan's value during the past two years, the dollar's dive means that Chinese laborers are working harder to sustain the Americans' high standard of living, which for years has relied on borrowed money - not on American production. A financial meltdown in the U.S. will affect China and its accumulated wealth badly.

Secondly, China is constantly in search of resources. The explosive growth of the Chinese economy has made the need for fuel and raw materials a priority, sending the price of commodities internationally sky high. Coupled with the declining value of the dollar, the main currency of international trade, not only are essential commodities, like oil and grain, enormously expensive, but this past year the situation has been exacerbated by growing concerns that climatic changes may result in serious global shortages in basic foodstuffs. This past month alone, the cost of foodstuffs in China rose by approximately 24 percent. Inflation and scarcity, particularly of basic necessities, including heating fuel, is the stuff public unrest is made of.

The third process is socio-political. The decision of the Chinese leadership, since 1989, to increasingly open up their society economically, and allowing it to grow into a significant component of the global economy, created openness on various levels, notwithstanding the efforts of Chinese officials to keep the clamps of centralized control in place. Such controls are impossible to apply perfectly. As such, Chinese society is becoming increasingly unequal, with a growing disparity between classes, and also growing unease, as the public has greater access to information and means with which to express dissatisfaction. Adding to this complex situation are minorities, comprising nearly 9 percent of China's 1.3 billion citizens, whose ethnic and cultural identities have for decades been oppressed in a process the Dalai Lama recently described as "cultural genocide."

Even though China is most often described in the U.S. as a "rival," in great part due to the lack of transparency endemic to its one-party system, in reality it is at this time much more of a partner. Indeed, over the past five years, the two states have been locked in a bear hug: each is too deeply reliant on the other for maintaining its economic ethos that a separation would be detrimental to both. The logic has so far been that the infusion of American dollars into China, and their return to the U.S. for investment (mostly in Treasury bills), is what is keeping the economies of the two countries afloat. What happens if that balance fails? How much devaluation of the dollar can China accept? How will Beijing weather a sustained depression in the U.S., with fewer buyers for its consumer products?

This is a precarious time for a Chinese political system that abhors instability. Will it make an audacious turn and break free of the American financial embrace, risking its economic growth and potential domestic upheaval? Will this not exacerbate the already dour economic conditions in the U.S., forecast to spread elsewhere? We will have to watch and see.
Michalis Firillas
21 March, 2008

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/966762.html

The Source of the Problem – the Fourth Estate and its role

2008-03-14T17:04:00.002+02:00

It was a hard week. But now it is better. The lull is over, “senior IDF sources” informed us – much to their relief. Nearly 30 Qassam rockets are plain obvious proof of that. For Palestinian groups in the Gaza Strip, the killing of five militants in the West Bank is also considered proof that the lull is over. There is nothing harder than waiting for the enemy to make a move. It’s like in the black and white movies, when the veteran Foreign Legion officer keeps telling his inexperienced troops to ‘wait… wait… wait…’ only to let loose in a massive fusillade, felling the charging natives at close range.

But last week was troubling for another reason. For nearly eight days, even before the lull became apparent – we cannot say that it ‘went into effect’ since we are told that there was no agreement behind the break in the rocket attacks – the media reported that negotiations were taking place. These were ‘indirect’ negotiations between Israel and Hamas, with Egyptian officials playing the role of mediators, moderators and brokers, all at once. The media insisted that negotiations were taking place, but senior government officials in Israel, including Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, were steadfast in their own assurances that there was no such diplomatic effort.

It is not uncommon for the media to report something only for government to deny it the next day. However, it is uncommon that such tit for tat would go on for nearly a week. The consistency of the reports, claiming that negotiations were taking place, and the equally stubborn insistence from government that there was nothing happening, was striking. It is the kind of consistency that one is not used to in this part of the world, where the situation can change two-three, sometimes more times, in a single 24 hour period.

Whether negotiations were or were not taking place is not the point here. Clearly different sides use the term ‘negotiations’ differently: the Palestinian Authority, the government, the IDF, the Hamas, the Egyptians, the journalists and others, all had their own agendas for interpreting certain behavior as ‘negotiations.’ In fact, that special sign language that Israel believes it shares with Arabs over the years, Palestinians and others, a combination of force, restraint, gestures of good will, punishment, etc., is also a form of ‘negotiations’ in this part of the world.

The point here is about sources, the integrity of the media, and its role in society. If for an entire week media outfits insist something is happening, citing unnamed sources, while the government is denying it, we have a problem. If the denials last 24 hours or even 48 hours, that is borderline normal. Usually, the story will change due to the pressure on those denying it, more information will be released or uncovered. But if they hold out for six-seven days, they have chosen to challenge the media’s claims. They are not just hiding. They are challenging the professionalism and the integrity of the reporters, as well as their ability to interpret the situation in their beat. At this point the media have two options: they must either go on the attack, proving the government officials are not telling the truth, or they must recall their story and acknowledge that they were wrong. Neither happened in this case, and this reflects poorly on the media and on our society.

The root of the problem is with a culture in which sources are overly protected. This creates a cycle of feeding/leaking information, a chafing of what is the most potent tool in a journalist’s kit – skepticism, and a failure to carry out to its maximum effect the role of the Fourth Estate in society. Obviously there are ethical and security restrictions. The famed Watergate scandal source, Deep Throat, remained anonymous for decades. There are censorship issues, particularly in security related stories, as well as gag orders protecting the identities of suspects. Neither are consistently applied and leaks with attached agendas are rampant.

But there is also a point in which either the sources need to be tested by their willingness to ‘come out’ or they need to be dropped. Cultivating sources is fundamental in journalism and competition can be fierce. But what is also basic is that attribution of sources is the norm, and protecting them is secondary and requires serious evaluation by the reporter and the editor. More often than not, the same story appearing in the Israeli press, quoting “sources” or “highly placed sources,” also appears in the international news agencies, except that in those stories the source is named, often because the information was provided at a public press conference. If the media in Israel is going to fulfill its duty with professionalism and unblemished integrity, it must begin to refer to its sources by name, at the risk of losing them. This will make this country more transparent and this society less corrupt.
Michalis Firillas
March 14, 2008

A new dawn in Cyprus, or just another day?

2008-03-12T11:20:00.004+02:00

Originally published in Haaretz in a more concise version in Hebrew, and in this version on the English website, February 25, 2008. Links to both below.

Sunday night's election of Demetris Christofias, the Communist party's secretary general, as President of the Republic of Cyprus is indeed historic. For the first time the powerful Communist party, AKEL, no longer satisfied with its traditional role as king-maker, took the risk and proposed its leader as candidate for the presidency. Also, for the first time since independence in 1960, 390 eligible Turkish Cypriots living in the government controlled south, voted in a presidential election. But that is where historic developments end, because when it comes to the problem most often associated with Cyprus, its division into Turkish and government controlled parts, the fundamental problems remain the same.

Since April 2004, the outgoing President Tassos Papadopoulos was lambasted in the western media, by supporters of Turkey's accession to the European Union, and by political opponents at home, for his stance against the UN sponsored plan to reunify Cyprus. Papadopoulos managed to rally more than 75 percent of Greek Cypriots against the plan. Henceforth, he was blamed for the impasse that befell talks between the two communities, and was used as an excuse eight months ago by Christofias to pull out of the coalition government and declare his candidacy.

Indeed, last week's surprising elimination of Papadopoulos during the first round of elections, led many pundits to hail this as a positive omen for renewed efforts to reunify the island. It would be mistaken to think that Papadopoulos, the last of the 'old guard' of Cypriot politicians, was ousted because of his refusal to budge from his strict interpretation of what constitutes Greek Cypriot interests. Some proof of this is that the centrist party that backed him, DIKO, in its vast majority opted for Christofias and not his rightist opponent, Ioannis Kassoulides. This is precisely because most Greek Cypriots who voted against the UN plan in 2004 are still not convinced that its proponents, Kassoulides among them, will hold steadfastly to Greek Cypriot interests and not, to use a commonly used term in Cyprus, "sell us out."

Papadopoulos was eliminated for two main reasons - both domestic. The first has to do with pure miscalculation, even mismanagement of his campaign. Most voters were convinced that Papadopoulos would go through to the final round, and voted along partisan lines. Since the two largest parties in Cyprus are AKEL and DISY, the rightist party which backed Kassoulides, that is where the votes went. Secondly, an incumbent government in Cyprus always has many disgruntled voters to cater to. Notwithstanding the severe attacks against Papadopoulos in the past six months, for allegedly "greasing" the palms of voters many voted for the two main parties on the basis of promises for post-election jobs, agricultural grants, and other benefits.

What will Christofias do now? Like his rightist opponent, he expressed interest in meeting with the Turkish Cypriots and moving the issue forward. He has three advantages over Papadopoulos: many Turkish Cypriots, especially on the left, believe that the head of AKEL, the only party that historically had members from both communities, will be a more agreeable interlocutor than Papadopoulos, whose nationalist credentials stigmatized him; second, he is a fresh face, but at the same time an experienced hand in Cypriot politics; finally, he will be a novelty, the first Communist leader of an EU member state, and this may gain him a period of grace both within the Union and among those involved in the Cypriot issue.

But the obstacles preventing the reunification of Cyprus are substantial, and it is hard to see how Christofias will be able to overcome them unless dramatic changes are made on the Turkish side, and predominantly in Ankara. The same problems that plagued the UN plan, namely refugees, property rights, issues of sovereignty, the presence of Turkish settlers, and the continued presence of Turkish troops on the island, all contribute to the current impasse. Is the EU carrot still enticing enough for Ankara to budge? Is it even relevant in light of recent developments in Europe where key leaders view Turkish accession as impractical? Does Kosovo constitute a precedent in the case of Cyprus? No less important, do the Greek Cypriots really want to coexist in a bizonal federation with the Turks, or has this formula expired?
Michalis Firillas
February 25, 2008

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/957951.html

http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=957715&contrassID=2&subContrassID=16&sbSubContrassID=0

A diplomatic bind not of our own making… for a change

2008-03-11T17:02:00.004+02:00

This appeared on March 11, 2008 on the Haaretz website. See url below

It is not too often Israel’s Foreign Ministry officials receive protestations for something not related to the Palestinians or the Arab-Israeli conflict at large. One could almost imagine a rather comical embarrassment when the Cypriot ambassador to Israel dropped in yesterday to complain about plans by the Turkish Cypriots to set up an economic interests office in Tel Aviv. Ambassador George Zodiates, normally a mild mannered man, held nothing back, drawing an analogy between the breakaway republic of Northern Cyprus and Hamas, asking how Israel would react if the radical Palestinian Islamic group sought to set up an office representing its interests in third countries.

So, what is this all about, and how will it affect the normally cordial and smooth relations between Israel and Cyprus? Like any good story, there are at least three sides to it. Israel had known for some time of plans by the Turkish Cypriots, mainly through Turkey, to try and establish some form of mission in Tel Aviv. Israel rejected out of hand any notion that such representation would have a diplomatic character, insisting that Jerusalem “operates in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations’ which does not recognize Northern Cyprus as an independent state. That is not to say that there have not been voices in the Israeli establishment calling for such recognition in order to curry favor with Ankara. Not surprisingly those suggesting this are primarily from the defense establishment, who are not exactly well known for grasping diplomatic nuances and international law.

Understanding the problem facing many countries unwilling to break with international law, the Turkish Cypriots and their advisers in Ankara opted for the trade office scenario. It is less threatening and hard to oppose legally. It does not necessitate diplomatic recognition yet its activities constitute what is essentially 75% of the work of any average diplomatic mission in Israel: public relations, trade, cultural exchanges, spreading the word that a state exists. As such, arguing, as one unnamed source quoted Sunday in Barak Ravid’s report, that this is not an attempt at “politics through the back door” is disingenuous. That is precisely what it is and that is the purpose of a broader onslaught of such offices Turkish Cypriots have sought to establish in key capitals the world over, most recently in Rome. No Israeli investor really needs a trade office in Tel Aviv to learn about options in northern Cyprus: anyone who has not already heard that there are real estate finds in northern Cyprus, with questionable ownership documents, can’t afford them anyway.

As for the Greek Cypriots, their angst over this stems from one basic fact: the sovereignty of Cyprus is all they have in a geopolitical environment where they are otherwise defenseless. Indeed, the Greek Cypriots are holding on to their internationally recognized status like a lifeline that protects their very existence. Any breach to that sovereignty, beyond that already suffered in 1974, when foreign intervention toppled the legitimate government, usurped their upper hand in inter-communal relations, and ushered in Turkish troops who continue to maintain their hold over northern Cyprus, is perceived by them to be tantamount to extinction. This is not automatically understood by visitors to Cyprus – certainly not since the spring 2003, when the Turkish army began lifting restrictions to freedom of movement by Greeks to the north. The complex status of Cyprus, its Greek and Turkish communities, the role of ‘mother’ countries Greece and Turkey, as well as that of Britain, the European Union and the international community, are beyond this discussion. But understanding what sovereignty means to the Greek Cypriots, and by extension to the Turkish Cypriots, is the beginning to appreciating the current state of the conflict on the island – which some Israelis have dubbed ‘virtual’ because it has, fortunately, been primarily non-violent for the past three decades.

Israel is in a bind and there are plenty of people at the Foreign Ministry who realize that this is something that will not go away soon. It is not the Greek Cypriots who they are worried about, but the list of others who may follow in the Turkish Cypriot footsteps, causing diplomatic headaches with more powerful neighbors and allies than Cyprus can ever be. The Kosovar Albanians may choose the option of a trade office – even though Israel has not extended diplomatic recognition to their fledgling statelet, drawing Serbian ire, and very likely that of their Russian patrons. Or, it could be the Kurds from northern Iraq, who may want to cash in on decades of cooperation with Israel, by breaking ground on a future diplomatic mission through the establishment of a trade office in Tel Aviv. I am sure Ankara will love that.

Michalis Firillas
March 11, 2008

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/963177.html

Kosovo: Coming soon to a theater near you

2008-03-07T19:52:00.007+02:00

Originally published in the editorial pages of Haaretz, February 29, 2008

It is not a good omen when a national flag is dominated by the actual outline of the geographic territory the state covers. It's probably a sign that there has been so much disagreement over the very decision to create the state, that drawing the shape of the country on the flag is meant to remind us all of its existence, manifesting the reality of being. Of course, it could always be that some foreign mediator, exhausted by the bickering of the natives, gave up trying to find shared national symbols and decided to state the most obvious common denominator. Thankfully, there have been only two such cases since 1945: Cyprus in 1960, and now Kosovo.

Of course, there are fundamental differences between them. Cyprus was recognized as an independent, sovereign state by the United Nations following the signing of detailed accords to govern the relationship between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island and the roles of external "guarantors," all meant to ensure that the fledgling republic would work. Kosovo has so far been recognized by fewer than two dozen of the UN's 192 members; it was created not by accord but by force; and while there is a great deal of enthusiasm among its majority ethnic-Albanian population, it is more the presence of an army of European Union and UN officials, as well as lots of NATO troops, that has gotten it this far. Another major difference is that while Kosovo is a breakaway state from within the recognized territory of another, Cyprus has its own breakaway state in the north, which was created - not unlike Kosovo - by outside intervention.

But the differences are not what is important to understand about Kosovo and Cyprus. What's important are the fundamentals, which are the reason that so many states expressed either direct opposition or skepticism about Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence earlier this month. The fundamentals are simple because they are the building blocks of the international system by which the world has been organized and coordinated since the introduction of the UN and its charter in 1945. These are based on the concepts of statehood, inviolable sovereign borders, consensus and international agreements. Most important, it is a system that stipulates that UN member states decide who the new members in this club will be; on the basis of their decision, Israel was given the legal right to exist, as was Cyprus. Not so Kosovo.

On the other hand, if there is something to be learned from history, it is that conditions are in constant flux. As such, Kosovo may be a watershed, ushering in a new era of international arrangements. Nonetheless, whether we decide to chuck out everything else that preceded it, in one juvenile swoop, or not, is up to us. Indeed, the most worrisome thing is that Kosovo may turn into an international precedent - something that clearly also worries its most fervent supporters, who emphasize at every turn that this is not the case. These assertions do not seem to assuage most UN members. Officials from Beijing to Buenos Aires, from Manila to Mexico City, are shaking their heads in disbelief. "Is it possible," they wonder, "that we might find ourselves in Serbia's shoes in a few years?" Perhaps.

If indeed the international system, as we have known it since 1945, is undergoing a devolution, with the UN becoming increasingly emasculated and its rule book sidelined, it is important to begin working on a new system. Certainly, international order has been undergoing radical changes since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the start of accelerated globalization and the emergence of nearly unfettered access to information. It is only natural that national minorities, disgruntled groups and oppressed communities will become more vocal and go as far as actively pursuing separatist policies. This is a trend that will likely intensify and is guaranteed to lead to bloodshed. Will it also lead to major international conflict between states?

With the advent of the era of nationalism, more than two centuries ago, the world has had to rebuild the system governing relations between states three times, starting with the end of the Napoleonic Wars. All three times, the rebuilding followed catastrophic fighting on a global scale. Neither war nor peace are inevitable, nor are they acts of nature. Mankind has sought to regulate both, through law, shared rules and consensus. Kosovo suggests that it is time for major readjustments, of the kind that are likely to challenge the sanctity we have so far attributed to the main building blocks of international systems: states and their sovereign rights. If Albanians in Kosovo deserve an independent state, then maybe so do Kurds, Turkish Cypriots, Druze, Romany, Basques - the list can be endless. The European Union may offer an interim model for a way forward - and indeed it is the promise of EU membership that is meant to sweeten the pill for the Serbs and curb Albanian enthusiasm. But first, maybe a decision needs to be made that fighting and dying for a piece of cloth with a colorful design, or just a plain old outline of a territory, is simply not worth it.

Michalis Firillas
February 28, 2008

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/959377.html

Democrats and Patriotism: The shockwaves of the USAF tanker deal and the election for president

2008-03-07T14:56:00.008+02:00

I have barely started this blog, and I am already violating my own rules by exceeding the 1,000 word limit originally promised. I apologize. Some readers suggested that I expand on some points, and also update on developments.

The shockwaves of the U.S. Air Force announcement on February 29, recommending the selection of an airborne tanker based on a passenger aircraft produced by Boeing’s arch-rival, Europe’s Airbus, have also reached the race for presidency. Democratic Senators Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, caught in a tight competition for their party’s nomination, eager to grab on to any opportunity to outshine the other’s patriotism, blasted the decision. For the purpose of the Democratic primaries this may be a passing issue. But it is likely to come back during the race against Senator John McCain – where the Democrats will try to outdo the Republicans at their own game and show up their red pedigree. McCain is also likely to be targeted more directly for his role in foiling the Boeing deal five years ago, primarily by initiating the investigation that uncovered corruption and inefficient spending practices. But the Democrats should tread with care over this one, because this is could be a double edged sword.

Not surprisingly, the pressure to ‘investigate’ the proposed deal, which initially involves four development aircraft and subsequently 175 more, a package worth as much as $40 billion over a 15 year period, has picked up momentum in Congress. That is what the people’s representatives do: they work for their clients – be they their constituents or the employers of their voters. And the lawmakers are pulling all the stops. Indeed, it seems like every possible jingoistic, protectionist argument is being taken out of the closet for this one. In addition to the classic ‘jobs will be lost to foreigners’ whining, the traditional charges that Airbus receives government subsidies, now the threat to American national security canard has raised its ugly head, since it is a well known fact that Europeans are ‘unreliable’ allies.

All this, of course, ignores three very important facts about this deal. First, it involves Northrop-Grumman, a venerable red, white and blue American defense contractor with projects like the Nimitz class aircraft carriers and the B-2 Stealth bomber among its contributions to U.S. national security. Northrop-Grumman will serve as the prime contractor in this project and this will contribute to bolstering the third largest defense contractor, and by extension the ability of the U.S. defense industry to meet both qualitatively and quantitatively, the needs of the U.S. armed forces. Created in a merger of two Cold War mainstays of the U.S. aerospace industry in 1994, the company managed to survive further consolidation in the industry when the government did not authorize a Lockheed offer to buy it. The likelihood that the tanker contract will grow to as much as a $100 billion deal over the coming decades is a major boost for Northrop-Grumman. The reduction of the bloated Cold War defense industry to two behemoths – Boeing and Lockheed – seemed like a natural evolution of a changing security environment. But there is a limit to the kind of streamlining that the defense industry can be allowed to undergo – certainly in light of the security challenges the U.S. is likely to face in the future.

Second, 60% of the selected aircraft, designated by the USAF as the KC-45A and based on the Airbus 330 passenger jet, will be built in the U.S., in new plants in Alabama and Mississippi. Not only will this provide jobs for as many as 25,000 Americans, according to Northrop-Grumman projections, it will also require parts from hundreds of U.S. manufacturers, and of course American-made engines, that General Electric will provide. It will also not take away jobs from Boeing, which has its hands full already with a number of projects, an orders list that is spilling at the rim, as well as upcoming programs for the Pentagon, such as a new rescue helicopter contract worth an estimated $10 billion. Added to this is the natural know-how exchange that emerges from this type of cooperation, which will benefit both the American and European partners in this venture, and by extension the technological base of both.

Third, and while Boeing would beg to differ, in a process that historically does not always guarantee that the best package or system is selected, the USAF made the right choice. Indeed, most independent analysts agree: the Airbus 330 is the better platform for the aerial refueling needs of the U.S. armed services on the basis of the known criteria. It is a more efficient aircraft, in great part because it is a newer design, particularly its wing. It is a larger aircraft than its rejected 767 competitor, capable of carrying at least 20% more fuel and even more cargo, but not as large as the 777, which is what Boeing would have offered had, as it now claims, not been led to believe that size was not the relevant issue. Its operational requirements, specifically the runway length it requires for take off, are slightly worse than the smaller 767, but much better than the 777, at maximum loads. It is a more expensive aircraft per unit than the 767, but its operating costs are lower, its fuel consumption is lower, and it has longer radius of operation than its Boeing rival. Furthermore, it is a tested model, in operation for more than a decade, and as far as the cost of new infrastructure for the upkeep and ground operations revolving around the use of the aircraft, similar expenses would have been incurred in introducing the 767.

For its part, Boeing is crying ‘foul’ and demanded a quick briefing by the relevant Air Force officials, justifying their selection. Such a meeting is scheduled to take place today, March 7, after which Boeing will decide whether to file an official complaint with the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional watchdog. Analysts and company officers have said that Boeing is not likely to pursue the matter after the debriefing, unless it emerges that there was “an irregularity in the proposal phase.” Boeing, half of whose $35 billion annual revenue comes from military contracts, is not interested to risk other projects by ruining its ties with the Pentagon.

Boeing knows that if there is anyone to blame for losing the multi-billion dollar project, it is Boeing itself. This began with the corrupt practices that led to the cancellation in 2003 of a project to lease aerial tankers from Boeing, the resignation of its CEO Phil Condit, prison sentences for two officials, and one suicide. Even so, on Wall Street the Boeing bid was considered the favorite in spite poor past performance and questionable cost estimates. For example, Boeing had experienced a series of setbacks in other programs, delivering 767-type aerial tankers to Italy and Japan late and experiencing difficulties with the development and production of its much touted 787 passenger jet.

Air Force officials involved in the decision rejected criticism pointing out that the proposal that won was chosen on merit. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates also backed the decision, stressing the fairness of the competition and explaining that the defense industry was becoming increasingly globalised. Indeed, judging from some of the comments from lawmakers in Congress, it is as if they had not realized that the U.S. is part of a global economy. One union leader went further, calling the deal “a subsidy for the French government,” playing on biases against French policies and wrongly ascribing Airbus and its parent company, European Aeronautic, Defense and Space (EADS), a purely French pedigree. Congressman John Murtha, chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, went as far as to point out that even though European member-states of NATO did not provide additional troops for the mission in Afghanistan, a major U.S. military contract was being awarded to the European consortium.

But the interesting development is that Murtha and other Democrats in Congress chose to target Republican presidential candidate, Senator John McCain for his role in killing the original Boeing deal of 2003. A Democratic Congressman from Illinois, Rahm Emmanuel, where Boeing is now headquartered, accused McCain of being responsible “for sending jobs overseas.” In a statement McCain was quoted as standing by his decision to stop the 2003 Boeing deal, and said that “I have always insisted that the Air Force buy major weapons through fair and open competition.” McCain had also stressed that impact on American jobs is not the main issue here but what is important is “to create the best weapons system we can at minimum cost to taxpayers.”

The presidential hopeful, Barack Obama, a Democratic Senator from Illinois, expressed shock and opposition to the deal. On this issue, he was not supporting change, for a change. His competitor for the Democratic nomination, Senator Hillary Clinton of New York said she could not understand how Airbus, against which the United States brought a suit at the World Trade Organization in 2004 for illegal subsidies, could win the tender. Of course, Clinton should be reminded that there is a counter-suit against Boeing in the same organization for what Airbus claims are essentially subsidies in the form of Pentagon military contracts, which bolster its passenger jet activities.

It is likely that after the fog clears over who the Democratic nominee will be, one of the issues McCain will be attacked on is his role in foiling Boeing’s bid to win the air tanker contract. It is one of the few areas they can challenge McCain on security. And the line will follow doubts about the wisdom of relying on foreign powers to provide parts for a system necessary for American defense. But this would be a mistake for two main reasons.

First, as Secretary of Defense Gates already noted, there is an increasing globalizing of the defense industry. While this is the first time in more than six decades that the U.S. has opted for a major strategic system, in such great numbers, produced by its allies, the real shift in policy was initiated when it was agreed to allow allies to ‘buy’ into the development of the Joint Strike Fighter in 2002. This introduced a major change in the willingness to ‘share’ technological know-how by the Pentagon and the American defense industry. This was followed by the symbolic but poignant decision to opt for a European helicopter, and in collaboration with the largest U.S. defense contractor, Lockheed, will provide a replacement for Marine One, used to ferry the President and other senior officials. Autarchy in defense production is a thing of bygone eras – both because of costs, technologies, alliance politics and shifting international conditions.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, this deal is a watershed in what it symbolizes for the western alliance. This is a sign of a new trend – motivated by a new understanding that the U.S. cannot go it alone, whether in Afghanistan or in future challenges. The recognition that its allies can provide the cutting edge technology for a system that is crucially important to American power projection and the ability of the western alliance to safeguard shared interests globally is a change in Washington. Just as this shift should not go unnoticed in European capitals, it is equally important for American politicians, and especially those aspiring to become the next Commander in Chief, to overcome biases whose demise is long overdue.
Michalis Firillas
7 March, 2008

USAF buying Airbus is a shift that Europe must not leave unnoticed

2008-03-04T17:28:00.007+02:00

The U.S. Air Force decision to recommend that Boeing’s arch-rival Airbus be selected to build a fleet of airborne tankers came as a shock to many. Whether the deal for 179 KC-45 aircraft (the USAF designation for the chosen air tankers), worth nearly $40 billion dollars over a 15 year period stays unchanged or not, remains to be seen. Some believe that Boeing will fight this hard, as will Congressmen bent on capitalizing over this ‘violation’ of the ‘Buy American’ motto. Given the thousands of jobs this project will create in the U.S, the fact that 60% of the aircraft will be made in the U.S. and with American components, and that the local partner in this venture is the venerable Northrop-Grumman, the third largest defense contractor in the U.S., it will be very difficult for the patriots to ground this deal. In any case, however one looks at it, this was the right decision and its implications are much more than economic.

From the start this was Boeing’s battle to lose – and it did. Five years ago the USAF was ready to sign a deal for tanker aircraft based on the 767, but cancelled as a result of a scandal that brought down Boeing’s CEO. This only exacerbated the already long overdue replacement of the ageing fleet of nearly 500 aerial tankers in service with the USAF, some dating back to the 1950s. Moreover, the chosen package is better: the A330, on which the KC-45 will be based, is a more modern, efficient, and larger aircraft, which offers greater flexibility in air refueling but is also capable of ferrying materials and personnel without compromising its main role as an airborne gas station.

No less important is what this deal does for Northrop-Grumman and by extension the ability of the U.S. defense industry to meet both qualitatively and quantitatively, the needs of the U.S. armed forces. Created in a merger of two Cold War mainstays of the U.S. aerospace industry in 1994, the company managed to survive further consolidation in the industry when the government did not authorize a Lockheed offer to buy it. The likelihood that the KC-45 contract will grow to as much as a $100 billion deal over the coming years is a major boost for Northrop-Grumman. The reduction of the bloated Cold War defense industry to two behemoths – Boeing and Lockheed – seemed like a natural evolution of a changing security environment. But there is a limit to the kind of streamlining that the defense industry can be allowed to undergo – certainly in light of the security challenges the U.S. is likely to face in the future.

But this deal is most of all a watershed in what it symbolizes for the western alliance. This is the first time in more than six decades that the U.S. has opted for a major, strategic system produced by its allies. Prior to this, rarely and for very specific reasons did the U.S. buy foreign systems, always in limited quantities. Without overstating the matter, there are signs of a new trend – motivated by a new understanding that the U.S. cannot go it alone, whether in Afghanistan or in future challenges. The recognition that its allies can provide the cutting edge technology for a system that is crucially important to American power projection and the ability of the western alliance to safeguard shared interests globally is a change in Washington that should not go unnoticed in European capitals.
Michalis Firillas
4 March, 2008