Let the West be One: Why the western alliance is needed more than ever

This article first appeared in Haaretz on 18 April, 2008.

The Western alliance has been a fractious affair at the best of times. That's hardly surprising. In an alliance of democracies, where domestic politics actively shape foreign policy, and free market economies, where competition is the norm, serious disagreements are to be expected. But when one adds to the blend satiated (some would say "fat"), aging, jaded societies that are increasingly reluctant to accept the concept of sacrifice, the question of the alliance's ability to be effective becomes a real concern.

There are many who would argue that the nearly eight years of the Bush administration have shown the Western alliance at both its best and its worst. Following the 9/11 attacks, the alliance was at the peak of cohesion, activating Article 5 of the NATO charter - by which the organization is mobilized in defense of a member state under attack - for the first time since its establishment

in 1949. But following the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the alliance began to show cracks, with Iraq becoming a veritable fault line - as the Bush administration opted increasingly to go it alone. Most recently, the question of relations with Russia returned to the fore, with Washington seemingly ready to risk the possibility of a renewed cold war in Europe. The decision at NATO's Bucharest Summit, earlier this month, not to invite Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance right now signaled a failure for the Bush administration, and perhaps even the end to a period in which NATO expansion eastward was considered an effective tool of democratization and stability.

The past eight years of tumult within the alliance have given many critics plenty of ammunition to decry NATO's relevance. Moreover, the unilateralism of the Bush administration has aggravated one of the thorniest and most sensitive issues for all alliances: equality among members. Even though it is historically not unusual for alliances to be centered around a major power, the Western alliance is anything but normative: It has managed to survive nearly 60 years, in part because of unparalleled consensus; and has contributed to and coexisted with the emergence of an alliance of European democracies − the European Union. As such, not only has the longevity of the alliance meant that member states have changed considerably since the early years, but the emergence of the EU has created rival institutions to NATO, and increasingly a sense that the Western alliance should come to represent a more equal cooperation between two large units - the U.S. and the EU.

This requires significant shifts in mindsets, both in Washington and in European capitals: Foreign policy and security priorities must be assessed differently, with broader interests in mind, and at the same time contributions and capabilities in personnel and hardware must be more readily forthcoming. When one adds to this equation the fact that not all European members of NATO are EU members - with Turkey, in particular, embodying complexities that go beyond issues of security - it is not difficult to appreciate the confusion that surrounds the Western alliance at this time.

Whether hardcore realist, or ardent idealist, anyone who believes in the idea of the West must also wish to see the alliance continue, and encourage its transformation into a more cohesive, effective force. At this particular juncture in history there are some basic facts that necessitate a very frank approach. For many in the non-Western world, the West represents a destination, a target, a dream and a future. However much Westerners criticize the way they have lived - and there is plenty to scorn - during the past 60 years, the West has offered a safe haven for the oppressed, a future for immigrants, a beacon of hope for those enslaved. It has offered economic opportunity, shared knowledge, open gates to newcomers seeking a better tomorrow, all because concepts of human rights, respect for individual freedoms, and free, unhindered dialogue are respected, protected, cherished values. The collective role of the Western alliance in maintaining these values should not be downplayed.

Furthermore, for the first time in the post-1945 era, there are real and immediate crises around the world that transcend boundaries and whose nature is only partially military. For example, in recent weeks, there have been statements by senior officials of the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, and elsewhere, pointing to a grave crisis in the availability of food, and warning that scarcity at such critical levels may lead to wars. Even the most skeptical student of history will be tempted to draw parallels to the Roman Empire in the 3rd-5th centuries C.E., besieged by hungry tribes seeking refuge from marauding invaders in the steppes, or worse, climatic changes that devastated their crops and hunting grounds.

It is doubtful whether a "Fortress West" mentality is the answer in a world whose countries are increasingly interlinked, but it is also clear that the West will have to play an increasingly active role, both at its borders and in more distant lands, if it is to preserve its shared interests and values, and also help others survive in increasingly difficult natural and political circumstances. Similarly, if crises like Darfur − a Western failure par excellence − are not to become increasingly common, the Western alliance must undergo the necessary changes to become more effective and its governments must find the wherewithal for the sacrifices this requires.

Michalis Firillas

18 April, 2008

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/976271.html

Don't forget the basics: Why Turkey must be directly involved in the talks

This article first appeared on 17 April, 2008 in In Depth, a bimonthly electronic newsletter of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, which is affiliated with the University of Nicosia.

Watching the fanfare in the media, particularly the foreign press, it is hard not to get caught up in the spirit of ‘change.’ As if to bolster the argument against the skeptics, there is progress to show: Ledra Street underwent a historic change with its opening to traffic between the two sides of Nicosia; and the chief negotiators of the two communities have nearly completed the list of 13 subjects that working teams will negotiate. In light of the short period after the election of Demetris Christofias to the Presidency that these developments occurred, this is undoubtedly progress. But for many Greek Cypriots, and veteran observers of developments in Cyprus, there is something fundamental that is missing: the issue of occupation.

Since the early 1980s the issue of the Turkish occupation of the northern third of the island and Ankara’s central role in altering ‘facts on the ground’ in Cyprus has been systematically pushed to the bottom of the agenda. For much of the period after the 1977 agreements on a bizonal federation, and until he stepped down in 2005, the focus of much of the negotiating efforts centered on ways to soften the intransigence of the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. The decades focused on Denktash contributed to an illusion that essentially, and one might add conveniently for certain parties, diverted attention from the basic fact that Turkey and its army were at the crux of the imposed changes on the Cypriot population.

While it is of utmost importance to hold bicommunal talks on a workable settlement to the internal dispute on the island, it is paramount that the issue of Turkish occupation of Cypriot sovereign territory be dealt with in parallel. There are three central reasons for this.

First, it is almost comical to pretend that the self-declared Turkish Cypriot statelet is anything but a creation of Ankara and a direct expression of Turkey’s efforts to irretrievably alter historical conditions on the ground, contravening agreements to which Ankara is signatory.

Second, Turkey has exclusive say on security issues over the territory of Cyprus it controls and over the Turkish Cypriot community; occasionally Ankara also seeks to extent that influence over all parts of Cyprus and beyond it. Most recently this occurred in relation to plans for offshore oil and gas exploration in an area to the southwest of the island.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, Turkey links Cyprus to many of its broader strategic goals and fluctuations in these affect Ankara’s attitudes in Cyprus. Thus, its relations with the European Union, its territorial claims in the Aegean, and its ambitions of influence in the Balkans, all affect its approach in Cyprus. Turkey’s European ambitions have already been integrated into the 2004 Annan Plan and it is hard to imagine how it will be possible to decouple this issue from any future solution in Cyprus.

Had Ankara merely retained troops on the island as a safeguard of an interim status quo, until territorial and constitutional agreements were reached between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, then perhaps the issue of Turkish role in Cyprus could have been left on the back burner. But Ankara is actively working to delegitimize the Republic of Cyprus, whose establishment it backed, whose constitutional status quo it claimed to seek to restore by its invasion, and whose territorial integrity it guarantees (at least on paper). Similarly, Ankara has consistently and aggressively Turkified the Turkish Cypriot community, by an infusion of tens of thousands of immigrants from mainland Turkey. How then is it possible to negotiate solely on the bicommunal level, ignoring the dominant role that Ankara plays on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, as well at their expense?

Turkey has consistently avoided direct negotiations with the Greek Cypriots and has been insufficiently pressed to partake in these. In part this stems from the same patronizing attitude which dominates Ankara’s relationship with the Turkish Cypriots, and also by extension an effort to reassert an imperial mantle over the entire island. But it is also part of a concerted effort to skirt its responsibilities, its violations of fundamentals of international law, and its wish to legitimize a post-1974 fait accompli.

While not many Greek Cypriots still believe that Cyprus can be restored to a 1974 ante status quo, any resolution to the Cyprus question involves Turkey, and it is important to pursue a parallel effort that would bring Turkey directly into the negotiations. All leverage should be brought to bear in this effort, not least of which should be a public relations campaign among decision makers in European capitals but also in Washington. However, ultimately, by restoring the basics to the negotiating table, the Greek Cypriots will be able to gauge Ankara’s reaction to any developments in talks with the Turkish Cypriots. Let’s call it a litmus test to Turkey’s real intent.

Michalis Firillas

17 April, 2008

http://www.cceia.unic.ac.cy/newsletter/articles/volume5_issue2

The final NATO summit of President George Bush

A version of this analysis was published in the Hebrew Print Edition of Haaretz on 2 April, 2008.

NATO summits are unique in that they occur at important junctures in the alliance's future. Indeed, the organization itself describes them as serving to “address issues of overarching political or strategic importance.” The Bucharest summit will do just that, with particular focus on further NATO expansion and the role its forces could play in missions, like Afghanistan and Kosovo. And even though it is not discussed openly, underlying this final summit for President George Bush, is the role his administration has played in furthering policies that many critics have described as ‘divisive’ for the alliance.

Arguably, no American president ever started his relationship with NATO with such promise only for it to culminate in divisions that have led some observers to openly question the alliance's future relevance. For the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter in response to 9/11, mobilizing the alliance in the defense of a member state. But since the early days of the war on terror, consensus within the alliance frayed as the Bush administration became increasingly unilateralist in its approach. Not only did veteran NATO members grow critical of Bush's policies in Iraq, but most of those who did commit troops to missions, like Afghanistan, became reluctant to authorize the deployment of their forces in areas of heavy fighting. Most recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized allies like Germany, for what he described as their unwillingness to fight, which he said is creating a two-tier alliance.

If the unilateralism of the Bush administration ruffled the feathers of some of more established members, it did not deter the new members, countries of the former Warsaw Pact. For yet other countries, particularly from the Balkans, but also states like Ukraine and Georgia, contributing to the U.S.-led operations abroad came to be regarded as a ticket to future membership. Indeed, Bush is now pushing hard to include Ukraine and Georgia in NATO. Not only is Russia strongly opposed to any such possibility, which will bring the NATO alliance even closer to its territory, but France and Germany are also against the move, worried that it may threaten European-Russian relations and have immediate consequences on energy supplies.

But if there is something that encapsulates the Bush administration's willingness to approach European security issues unilaterally, as it takes advantage of its relative popularity among former Soviet satellites, it is the missile defense system Washington is negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic. Russian reaction has been fierce, threatening to target capitals of the alliance with nuclear weapons. Not only in Paris and Berlin, but at NATO's Brussels headquarters too, the notion that the U.S. was independently negotiating the deployment of a missile defense system drew strong criticism. In any case, the issue is still pending, with Warsaw and Prague playing hard ball with Washington, hoping for a better package of benefits.

However, not all is bleak when looking at the Bush 'imprint' on the alliance. The new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, whose declared admiration for America had drawn criticism at home, has said that he would like to see France return to NATO's joint command structure, and promised French combat troops for Afghanistan. This summit will also usher in two new members – Albania and Croatia – and if the dispute over Macedonia's name is resolved, it too will join the alliance. These are countries eager to toe the American line in return for investment opportunities and help in upgrading their military capabilities.

It is important to remember that NATO, in spite its shortcomings, has succeeded as an alliance since 1949 because it is based on consensus. A great part of that consensus relies on the belief of all member states that it is better to be in the alliance than out of it – and for this they are willing to compromise. As such, even an administration as divisive and uncompromising as that of George Bush is not likely to leave an indelible mark on the alliance – which may mean that NATO will continue its slow evolution, from a Cold War alliance to a catalyst for peace.

Michalis Firillas

1 April, 2008

Arab League (part one): Go to Jerusalem

Anyone with children or siblings would recognize the scene: mutual recrimination, mocking expressions, and sometimes a little tussle here and there. No, this is not another classic episode of Roseanne, that show from the late 80s which established the format for other dysfunctional families on television. It is yet another Arab League summit.

But this particular summit, which began yesterday in Damascus, may qualify as a challenger for the prize for worst possible. Even by the high standards of Arab League melodrama and disunity, the Damascus 2008 summit is disturbingly problematic. Indeed, it could be argued that this summit may have marked a new nadir in Arab disunity, of the sort achieved in the early 1980s when Egypt, a founding member and leading force of the organization was boycotted for its decision to sign a separate peace agreement with Israel.

Only 12 of the 22 members of the League were represented at the summit by their respective heads of state. Lebanon boycotted the summit, while Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, leading members of the organization, sent low level officials to the Syrian capital. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister went further and said Damascus should be ‘punished’ for its meddling in Lebanese politics and for foiling an agreement that would resolve the political crisis that has plagued the country for more than a year.

The Syrians tried to keep up a façade of calm, insisting that that in spite all pressures, and a full-court-press by the U.S., in place since the Damascus was included in the axis of evil by President George Bush, they have managed to host a respectable League summit. They also took a jab at the Saudis by pointing out that in spite their criticism of close ties between Damascus and Tehran, ‘at least we didn’t invite a Persian to an Arab summit,’ reference to Riyadh’s invitation of Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Gulf Cooperation Council conference in 2007.

The infighting within the Arab world over the role and inroads Iran is making, either in Lebanon, Iraq, the Gaza Strip and elsewhere, is not likely to be resolved any time soon, and we are in for more rounds of similar displays of disunity in the coming months. But one of the more troubling aspects of this summit is the support for a threat to rescind the Arab initiative of 2002, which offered Israel peace and normalization in return for a pullout of territory occupied since 1967. The deal includes a few other conditions, most importantly from Israel’s point of view, of a call for a negotiated agreement on the return of Palestinian refugees. The firebrand Secretary General of the League, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, said that a decision was made “to evaluate and review Arab strategies and the plan of action regarding reviving the peace process.” This review is set to begin sometime in the middle of this year. A similar decision was reached by Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo three weeks ago.

Let’s acknowledge from the onset that Israel is no saint. There is no point in detailing here the shortcomings of its policies, or lack thereof, over the years. The point is that plenty of time was wasted and conscious decisions were made, for domestic political reasons, to avoid taking courageous and substantive steps toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, notwithstanding terrorism and violence. But it should also be said that the Arab League initiative is only half-impressive. Its formula is well known and it comes down to ‘land for peace.’ That is not good enough.

If the Arab League really wants to leave its mark in history, and does believe that adhering to international law is critical to resolving the conflict, then it needs to do something truly impressive. All 22 heads of state should go to Jerusalem as a group, pray at Al-Aqsa mosque, and visit the Knesset. And there they should declare that they recognize Israel’s right to exist within the 4 June 1967 borders, in line with the same United Nations decision to support the partition of Palestine and the 1949 armistice agreements. Of course, they should also take the opportunity to remind the Israelis that if they want normalization, peace, diplomatic missions, etc., they need to relinquish all occupied territory, allow the establishment of a Palestinian state, and assist it to become a viable, livable country. Moreover, they should also tell Israel that this historic visit does not mean diplomatic recognition, but it means historical reconciliation with the partition of Palestine and the rejection of plans, practical or imaginary, to destroy Israel.

In the next segment of this entry, I will explain to the skeptics why this seemingly impossible act of unity and symbolism on the part of the Arab League is not only doable but urgently necessary at this time.

Michalis Firillas

31 March, 2008

Olympian politics – the continuation of war by other means

The lighting of the Olympic flame is a religious affair. The reenactment of the ancient ceremony is meant to symbolize both the eternal spirit of humanity and our collective belief in peace, shared values, and fair competition. Presumably it is the belief in the sanctity of the games that has led western leaders to call on keeping politics out of the 29th Olympiad, fending off calls for a boycott by democracies of China’s crowning moment. Unfortunately, if the dictators in Beijing remain steadfast in their refusal to recognize that things are changing – including inside the borders of China – it will become increasingly difficult for western leaders to ignore the calls for greater freedom for oppressed minorities there.

The argument that politics and sport do not mix is flawed at its root. The ancient games were all about politics and city-state pride. Recognizing them as a celebration for all Greeks, the city-states would call off war for their duration and would laud their victors as symbols of the superiority of their city. Sometimes, as legend has it, the city state would raze some of its fortifications as a symbol of its invincibility. When Theodosius I banned the Olympic games in 394 AD, he did so for politics – deeming the games pagan in what was by now a Christian Roman Empire.

Since the modern games were inaugurated in 1896, politics intervened on a number of occasions. Most famously the games became political at the Berlin games in 1936, briefly in Mexico City in 1968, at the Munich Olympics in 1972, in Moscow and Los Angeles, in 1980 and 1984 respectively. As the 2008 summer games approach we will witness an increasingly intensifying campaign by activists, which will not leave governments in the west unaffected, and will likely transform the Beijing Olympiad into a highly political affair.

There is nothing wrong with mixing politics and sport. The United States is an oddity in this respect, because its professional sports franchises are apolitical. Republicans and Democrats alike, Americans of all races, religions and creeds, support the same sports team. European soccer was never apolitical – even though there is growing tendency to distort the lines between political identity and commercial interests with the emergence and success of the Champions League. But for most of the past century, clubs in many countries in the world have been identified with the right or the left sides of the political spectrum, with the haves or the have-nots, with the fascists or the communists.

The modern Olympics too have always been political – both in the way the nation-state adopts them as symbols of its achievement and national pride, but also in the way they are awarded. Recently there was also a question raised about the way Kosovo would be represented in the Olympics, since it is a state that the United Nations does not yet recognize. For that there may be solutions – including letting Kosovar athletes march behind the rest of the national flags parading during the opening ceremony. But what does need to be resolved is the question of awarding the games to totalitarian regimes – especially in the post-Cold War era. Should China have been awarded the games in the first place, in view of its dismal human rights record?

Despotic regimes recognize full well the public relations value of displaying their might, be it in military parades or in the number of gold medals accumulated by its robotic athletes. Even the most liberal among us note the medal count, and for smaller states any medal is a source of national pride - of collective achievement. For regimes like the one in Beijing, Mussolini’s Italy during the soccer World Cup in 1934, Hitler’s Germany in 1936, or the Soviets in 1980, the international focus on them and their regime is part of an orchestrated show of their system’s superiority. The international community should cease collaborating with such regimes.

The arguments made that, for example, the thousands of reporters who will flood Beijing will also expose the shortcomings of the Chinese state are insufficient. Western governments should pressure Beijing to speed up reforms in matters that are not solely economic – including matters pertaining to the rights of workers and improved living standards for the millions of Chinese citizens who are not benefiting from the capitalist windfall. And, the western leadership should not shy from spoiling Beijing’s party: athletes should wear armbands expressing their opposition to the oppression of minorities and dissidents in China, and heads of state should not participate in the opening or closing ceremonies. Maybe then Beijing will begin to appreciate the true Olympic spirit.
Michalis Firillas
25 March, 2008

U.S. crashes - China breaks

This article originally appeared in Haaretz on 21 March, 2008.

News from America is bleak. Earlier this week the Federal Reserve came to the rescue and backed a deal for the sale of a paragon of Wall Street culture, Bear Stearns, to JP Morgan Chase, for a mere $2 per share. Lehman Brothers, another major investment bank, was also felt to be tottering. Responding to the crisis of liquidity - the availability of money for banks to loan, primarily to other smaller banks and then on to Joe in the street - the Fed dropped the rate by a further 0.75 percent. After weeks of dire financial instability, and months of efforts by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke to stem the downward spiral sparked by the subprime collapse, mostly by repeated cuts in the interest rate, the question on everyone's lips is one of anticipation: How long will this go on? Perhaps they should also be asking, "How much worse can this get?"

Even the most optimistic forecasts do not exclude the possibility that a recession, or worse, stagflation (high prices on top of no jobs), will go on for many months. Realists will also tell you that unless the legacy of former Fed chief Alan Greenspan, primarily of averting recession by adding cash to the economy through interest-rate manipulation and lax lending regulation, is adjusted to the current international conditions, we are all in for lean times. The condition of the number one economy in the world will obviously affect the rest of the world. But as you watch America tumble into what may be the biggest economic crisis since World War II, from an international perspective, China is the one to keep an eye on.

Let's state the obvious: China is the world's most populous country; on average its economy is the fastest-growing one in Asia; its economy is a mixed bag of reforms and strict state controls; and it is not a democracy. Managing this problematic combination of factors is a complex task to say the least, but more important, it is not something that can go on indefinitely. Moreover, these factors have also contributed to three parallel processes that have matured and are now converging in China at this critical juncture, when the American economy is in a downward spin. The impact of this convergence may mean that the biggest domino in the world economy will also fall over, and this is a crash that will not only be heard around the world, but may also turn bloody.

The first process is the enrichment of China. The opening of the Chinese economy to foreign investment made it part of the global capitalist economy, bringing in billions of dollars from exports of consumer goods and contributing to the emergence of a middle class. The insatiable hunger of the developed world, particularly the United States, for inexpensive Made in China products transformed the country into what is essentially a lender of money. China has the largest foreign reserves in the world, estimated at a staggering $1.4 trillion dollars, nearly 70 percent of which is held in U.S. dollars. Even with the gradual, yet significant, adjustments of the yuan's value during the past two years, the dollar's dive means that Chinese laborers are working harder to sustain the Americans' high standard of living, which for years has relied on borrowed money - not on American production. A financial meltdown in the U.S. will affect China and its accumulated wealth badly.

Secondly, China is constantly in search of resources. The explosive growth of the Chinese economy has made the need for fuel and raw materials a priority, sending the price of commodities internationally sky high. Coupled with the declining value of the dollar, the main currency of international trade, not only are essential commodities, like oil and grain, enormously expensive, but this past year the situation has been exacerbated by growing concerns that climatic changes may result in serious global shortages in basic foodstuffs. This past month alone, the cost of foodstuffs in China rose by approximately 24 percent. Inflation and scarcity, particularly of basic necessities, including heating fuel, is the stuff public unrest is made of.

The third process is socio-political. The decision of the Chinese leadership, since 1989, to increasingly open up their society economically, and allowing it to grow into a significant component of the global economy, created openness on various levels, notwithstanding the efforts of Chinese officials to keep the clamps of centralized control in place. Such controls are impossible to apply perfectly. As such, Chinese society is becoming increasingly unequal, with a growing disparity between classes, and also growing unease, as the public has greater access to information and means with which to express dissatisfaction. Adding to this complex situation are minorities, comprising nearly 9 percent of China's 1.3 billion citizens, whose ethnic and cultural identities have for decades been oppressed in a process the Dalai Lama recently described as "cultural genocide."

Even though China is most often described in the U.S. as a "rival," in great part due to the lack of transparency endemic to its one-party system, in reality it is at this time much more of a partner. Indeed, over the past five years, the two states have been locked in a bear hug: each is too deeply reliant on the other for maintaining its economic ethos that a separation would be detrimental to both. The logic has so far been that the infusion of American dollars into China, and their return to the U.S. for investment (mostly in Treasury bills), is what is keeping the economies of the two countries afloat. What happens if that balance fails? How much devaluation of the dollar can China accept? How will Beijing weather a sustained depression in the U.S., with fewer buyers for its consumer products?

This is a precarious time for a Chinese political system that abhors instability. Will it make an audacious turn and break free of the American financial embrace, risking its economic growth and potential domestic upheaval? Will this not exacerbate the already dour economic conditions in the U.S., forecast to spread elsewhere? We will have to watch and see.
Michalis Firillas
21 March, 2008

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/966762.html

The Source of the Problem – the Fourth Estate and its role

It was a hard week. But now it is better. The lull is over, “senior IDF sources” informed us – much to their relief. Nearly 30 Qassam rockets are plain obvious proof of that. For Palestinian groups in the Gaza Strip, the killing of five militants in the West Bank is also considered proof that the lull is over. There is nothing harder than waiting for the enemy to make a move. It’s like in the black and white movies, when the veteran Foreign Legion officer keeps telling his inexperienced troops to ‘wait… wait… wait…’ only to let loose in a massive fusillade, felling the charging natives at close range.

But last week was troubling for another reason. For nearly eight days, even before the lull became apparent – we cannot say that it ‘went into effect’ since we are told that there was no agreement behind the break in the rocket attacks – the media reported that negotiations were taking place. These were ‘indirect’ negotiations between Israel and Hamas, with Egyptian officials playing the role of mediators, moderators and brokers, all at once. The media insisted that negotiations were taking place, but senior government officials in Israel, including Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, were steadfast in their own assurances that there was no such diplomatic effort.

It is not uncommon for the media to report something only for government to deny it the next day. However, it is uncommon that such tit for tat would go on for nearly a week. The consistency of the reports, claiming that negotiations were taking place, and the equally stubborn insistence from government that there was nothing happening, was striking. It is the kind of consistency that one is not used to in this part of the world, where the situation can change two-three, sometimes more times, in a single 24 hour period.

Whether negotiations were or were not taking place is not the point here. Clearly different sides use the term ‘negotiations’ differently: the Palestinian Authority, the government, the IDF, the Hamas, the Egyptians, the journalists and others, all had their own agendas for interpreting certain behavior as ‘negotiations.’ In fact, that special sign language that Israel believes it shares with Arabs over the years, Palestinians and others, a combination of force, restraint, gestures of good will, punishment, etc., is also a form of ‘negotiations’ in this part of the world.

The point here is about sources, the integrity of the media, and its role in society. If for an entire week media outfits insist something is happening, citing unnamed sources, while the government is denying it, we have a problem. If the denials last 24 hours or even 48 hours, that is borderline normal. Usually, the story will change due to the pressure on those denying it, more information will be released or uncovered. But if they hold out for six-seven days, they have chosen to challenge the media’s claims. They are not just hiding. They are challenging the professionalism and the integrity of the reporters, as well as their ability to interpret the situation in their beat. At this point the media have two options: they must either go on the attack, proving the government officials are not telling the truth, or they must recall their story and acknowledge that they were wrong. Neither happened in this case, and this reflects poorly on the media and on our society.

The root of the problem is with a culture in which sources are overly protected. This creates a cycle of feeding/leaking information, a chafing of what is the most potent tool in a journalist’s kit – skepticism, and a failure to carry out to its maximum effect the role of the Fourth Estate in society. Obviously there are ethical and security restrictions. The famed Watergate scandal source, Deep Throat, remained anonymous for decades. There are censorship issues, particularly in security related stories, as well as gag orders protecting the identities of suspects. Neither are consistently applied and leaks with attached agendas are rampant.

But there is also a point in which either the sources need to be tested by their willingness to ‘come out’ or they need to be dropped. Cultivating sources is fundamental in journalism and competition can be fierce. But what is also basic is that attribution of sources is the norm, and protecting them is secondary and requires serious evaluation by the reporter and the editor. More often than not, the same story appearing in the Israeli press, quoting “sources” or “highly placed sources,” also appears in the international news agencies, except that in those stories the source is named, often because the information was provided at a public press conference. If the media in Israel is going to fulfill its duty with professionalism and unblemished integrity, it must begin to refer to its sources by name, at the risk of losing them. This will make this country more transparent and this society less corrupt.
Michalis Firillas
March 14, 2008