Let the West be One: Why the western alliance is needed more than ever

This article first appeared in Haaretz on 18 April, 2008.

The Western alliance has been a fractious affair at the best of times. That's hardly surprising. In an alliance of democracies, where domestic politics actively shape foreign policy, and free market economies, where competition is the norm, serious disagreements are to be expected. But when one adds to the blend satiated (some would say "fat"), aging, jaded societies that are increasingly reluctant to accept the concept of sacrifice, the question of the alliance's ability to be effective becomes a real concern.

There are many who would argue that the nearly eight years of the Bush administration have shown the Western alliance at both its best and its worst. Following the 9/11 attacks, the alliance was at the peak of cohesion, activating Article 5 of the NATO charter - by which the organization is mobilized in defense of a member state under attack - for the first time since its establishment

in 1949. But following the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the alliance began to show cracks, with Iraq becoming a veritable fault line - as the Bush administration opted increasingly to go it alone. Most recently, the question of relations with Russia returned to the fore, with Washington seemingly ready to risk the possibility of a renewed cold war in Europe. The decision at NATO's Bucharest Summit, earlier this month, not to invite Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance right now signaled a failure for the Bush administration, and perhaps even the end to a period in which NATO expansion eastward was considered an effective tool of democratization and stability.

The past eight years of tumult within the alliance have given many critics plenty of ammunition to decry NATO's relevance. Moreover, the unilateralism of the Bush administration has aggravated one of the thorniest and most sensitive issues for all alliances: equality among members. Even though it is historically not unusual for alliances to be centered around a major power, the Western alliance is anything but normative: It has managed to survive nearly 60 years, in part because of unparalleled consensus; and has contributed to and coexisted with the emergence of an alliance of European democracies − the European Union. As such, not only has the longevity of the alliance meant that member states have changed considerably since the early years, but the emergence of the EU has created rival institutions to NATO, and increasingly a sense that the Western alliance should come to represent a more equal cooperation between two large units - the U.S. and the EU.

This requires significant shifts in mindsets, both in Washington and in European capitals: Foreign policy and security priorities must be assessed differently, with broader interests in mind, and at the same time contributions and capabilities in personnel and hardware must be more readily forthcoming. When one adds to this equation the fact that not all European members of NATO are EU members - with Turkey, in particular, embodying complexities that go beyond issues of security - it is not difficult to appreciate the confusion that surrounds the Western alliance at this time.

Whether hardcore realist, or ardent idealist, anyone who believes in the idea of the West must also wish to see the alliance continue, and encourage its transformation into a more cohesive, effective force. At this particular juncture in history there are some basic facts that necessitate a very frank approach. For many in the non-Western world, the West represents a destination, a target, a dream and a future. However much Westerners criticize the way they have lived - and there is plenty to scorn - during the past 60 years, the West has offered a safe haven for the oppressed, a future for immigrants, a beacon of hope for those enslaved. It has offered economic opportunity, shared knowledge, open gates to newcomers seeking a better tomorrow, all because concepts of human rights, respect for individual freedoms, and free, unhindered dialogue are respected, protected, cherished values. The collective role of the Western alliance in maintaining these values should not be downplayed.

Furthermore, for the first time in the post-1945 era, there are real and immediate crises around the world that transcend boundaries and whose nature is only partially military. For example, in recent weeks, there have been statements by senior officials of the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, and elsewhere, pointing to a grave crisis in the availability of food, and warning that scarcity at such critical levels may lead to wars. Even the most skeptical student of history will be tempted to draw parallels to the Roman Empire in the 3rd-5th centuries C.E., besieged by hungry tribes seeking refuge from marauding invaders in the steppes, or worse, climatic changes that devastated their crops and hunting grounds.

It is doubtful whether a "Fortress West" mentality is the answer in a world whose countries are increasingly interlinked, but it is also clear that the West will have to play an increasingly active role, both at its borders and in more distant lands, if it is to preserve its shared interests and values, and also help others survive in increasingly difficult natural and political circumstances. Similarly, if crises like Darfur − a Western failure par excellence − are not to become increasingly common, the Western alliance must undergo the necessary changes to become more effective and its governments must find the wherewithal for the sacrifices this requires.

Michalis Firillas

18 April, 2008

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/976271.html

The final NATO summit of President George Bush

A version of this analysis was published in the Hebrew Print Edition of Haaretz on 2 April, 2008.

NATO summits are unique in that they occur at important junctures in the alliance's future. Indeed, the organization itself describes them as serving to “address issues of overarching political or strategic importance.” The Bucharest summit will do just that, with particular focus on further NATO expansion and the role its forces could play in missions, like Afghanistan and Kosovo. And even though it is not discussed openly, underlying this final summit for President George Bush, is the role his administration has played in furthering policies that many critics have described as ‘divisive’ for the alliance.

Arguably, no American president ever started his relationship with NATO with such promise only for it to culminate in divisions that have led some observers to openly question the alliance's future relevance. For the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter in response to 9/11, mobilizing the alliance in the defense of a member state. But since the early days of the war on terror, consensus within the alliance frayed as the Bush administration became increasingly unilateralist in its approach. Not only did veteran NATO members grow critical of Bush's policies in Iraq, but most of those who did commit troops to missions, like Afghanistan, became reluctant to authorize the deployment of their forces in areas of heavy fighting. Most recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized allies like Germany, for what he described as their unwillingness to fight, which he said is creating a two-tier alliance.

If the unilateralism of the Bush administration ruffled the feathers of some of more established members, it did not deter the new members, countries of the former Warsaw Pact. For yet other countries, particularly from the Balkans, but also states like Ukraine and Georgia, contributing to the U.S.-led operations abroad came to be regarded as a ticket to future membership. Indeed, Bush is now pushing hard to include Ukraine and Georgia in NATO. Not only is Russia strongly opposed to any such possibility, which will bring the NATO alliance even closer to its territory, but France and Germany are also against the move, worried that it may threaten European-Russian relations and have immediate consequences on energy supplies.

But if there is something that encapsulates the Bush administration's willingness to approach European security issues unilaterally, as it takes advantage of its relative popularity among former Soviet satellites, it is the missile defense system Washington is negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic. Russian reaction has been fierce, threatening to target capitals of the alliance with nuclear weapons. Not only in Paris and Berlin, but at NATO's Brussels headquarters too, the notion that the U.S. was independently negotiating the deployment of a missile defense system drew strong criticism. In any case, the issue is still pending, with Warsaw and Prague playing hard ball with Washington, hoping for a better package of benefits.

However, not all is bleak when looking at the Bush 'imprint' on the alliance. The new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, whose declared admiration for America had drawn criticism at home, has said that he would like to see France return to NATO's joint command structure, and promised French combat troops for Afghanistan. This summit will also usher in two new members – Albania and Croatia – and if the dispute over Macedonia's name is resolved, it too will join the alliance. These are countries eager to toe the American line in return for investment opportunities and help in upgrading their military capabilities.

It is important to remember that NATO, in spite its shortcomings, has succeeded as an alliance since 1949 because it is based on consensus. A great part of that consensus relies on the belief of all member states that it is better to be in the alliance than out of it – and for this they are willing to compromise. As such, even an administration as divisive and uncompromising as that of George Bush is not likely to leave an indelible mark on the alliance – which may mean that NATO will continue its slow evolution, from a Cold War alliance to a catalyst for peace.

Michalis Firillas

1 April, 2008

Democrats and Patriotism: The shockwaves of the USAF tanker deal and the election for president

I have barely started this blog, and I am already violating my own rules by exceeding the 1,000 word limit originally promised. I apologize. Some readers suggested that I expand on some points, and also update on developments.

The shockwaves of the U.S. Air Force announcement on February 29, recommending the selection of an airborne tanker based on a passenger aircraft produced by Boeing’s arch-rival, Europe’s Airbus, have also reached the race for presidency. Democratic Senators Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, caught in a tight competition for their party’s nomination, eager to grab on to any opportunity to outshine the other’s patriotism, blasted the decision. For the purpose of the Democratic primaries this may be a passing issue. But it is likely to come back during the race against Senator John McCain – where the Democrats will try to outdo the Republicans at their own game and show up their red pedigree. McCain is also likely to be targeted more directly for his role in foiling the Boeing deal five years ago, primarily by initiating the investigation that uncovered corruption and inefficient spending practices. But the Democrats should tread with care over this one, because this is could be a double edged sword.

Not surprisingly, the pressure to ‘investigate’ the proposed deal, which initially involves four development aircraft and subsequently 175 more, a package worth as much as $40 billion over a 15 year period, has picked up momentum in Congress. That is what the people’s representatives do: they work for their clients – be they their constituents or the employers of their voters. And the lawmakers are pulling all the stops. Indeed, it seems like every possible jingoistic, protectionist argument is being taken out of the closet for this one. In addition to the classic ‘jobs will be lost to foreigners’ whining, the traditional charges that Airbus receives government subsidies, now the threat to American national security canard has raised its ugly head, since it is a well known fact that Europeans are ‘unreliable’ allies.

All this, of course, ignores three very important facts about this deal. First, it involves Northrop-Grumman, a venerable red, white and blue American defense contractor with projects like the Nimitz class aircraft carriers and the B-2 Stealth bomber among its contributions to U.S. national security. Northrop-Grumman will serve as the prime contractor in this project and this will contribute to bolstering the third largest defense contractor, and by extension the ability of the U.S. defense industry to meet both qualitatively and quantitatively, the needs of the U.S. armed forces. Created in a merger of two Cold War mainstays of the U.S. aerospace industry in 1994, the company managed to survive further consolidation in the industry when the government did not authorize a Lockheed offer to buy it. The likelihood that the tanker contract will grow to as much as a $100 billion deal over the coming decades is a major boost for Northrop-Grumman. The reduction of the bloated Cold War defense industry to two behemoths – Boeing and Lockheed – seemed like a natural evolution of a changing security environment. But there is a limit to the kind of streamlining that the defense industry can be allowed to undergo – certainly in light of the security challenges the U.S. is likely to face in the future.

Second, 60% of the selected aircraft, designated by the USAF as the KC-45A and based on the Airbus 330 passenger jet, will be built in the U.S., in new plants in Alabama and Mississippi. Not only will this provide jobs for as many as 25,000 Americans, according to Northrop-Grumman projections, it will also require parts from hundreds of U.S. manufacturers, and of course American-made engines, that General Electric will provide. It will also not take away jobs from Boeing, which has its hands full already with a number of projects, an orders list that is spilling at the rim, as well as upcoming programs for the Pentagon, such as a new rescue helicopter contract worth an estimated $10 billion. Added to this is the natural know-how exchange that emerges from this type of cooperation, which will benefit both the American and European partners in this venture, and by extension the technological base of both.

Third, and while Boeing would beg to differ, in a process that historically does not always guarantee that the best package or system is selected, the USAF made the right choice. Indeed, most independent analysts agree: the Airbus 330 is the better platform for the aerial refueling needs of the U.S. armed services on the basis of the known criteria. It is a more efficient aircraft, in great part because it is a newer design, particularly its wing. It is a larger aircraft than its rejected 767 competitor, capable of carrying at least 20% more fuel and even more cargo, but not as large as the 777, which is what Boeing would have offered had, as it now claims, not been led to believe that size was not the relevant issue. Its operational requirements, specifically the runway length it requires for take off, are slightly worse than the smaller 767, but much better than the 777, at maximum loads. It is a more expensive aircraft per unit than the 767, but its operating costs are lower, its fuel consumption is lower, and it has longer radius of operation than its Boeing rival. Furthermore, it is a tested model, in operation for more than a decade, and as far as the cost of new infrastructure for the upkeep and ground operations revolving around the use of the aircraft, similar expenses would have been incurred in introducing the 767.

For its part, Boeing is crying ‘foul’ and demanded a quick briefing by the relevant Air Force officials, justifying their selection. Such a meeting is scheduled to take place today, March 7, after which Boeing will decide whether to file an official complaint with the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional watchdog. Analysts and company officers have said that Boeing is not likely to pursue the matter after the debriefing, unless it emerges that there was “an irregularity in the proposal phase.” Boeing, half of whose $35 billion annual revenue comes from military contracts, is not interested to risk other projects by ruining its ties with the Pentagon.

Boeing knows that if there is anyone to blame for losing the multi-billion dollar project, it is Boeing itself. This began with the corrupt practices that led to the cancellation in 2003 of a project to lease aerial tankers from Boeing, the resignation of its CEO Phil Condit, prison sentences for two officials, and one suicide. Even so, on Wall Street the Boeing bid was considered the favorite in spite poor past performance and questionable cost estimates. For example, Boeing had experienced a series of setbacks in other programs, delivering 767-type aerial tankers to Italy and Japan late and experiencing difficulties with the development and production of its much touted 787 passenger jet.

Air Force officials involved in the decision rejected criticism pointing out that the proposal that won was chosen on merit. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates also backed the decision, stressing the fairness of the competition and explaining that the defense industry was becoming increasingly globalised. Indeed, judging from some of the comments from lawmakers in Congress, it is as if they had not realized that the U.S. is part of a global economy. One union leader went further, calling the deal “a subsidy for the French government,” playing on biases against French policies and wrongly ascribing Airbus and its parent company, European Aeronautic, Defense and Space (EADS), a purely French pedigree. Congressman John Murtha, chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, went as far as to point out that even though European member-states of NATO did not provide additional troops for the mission in Afghanistan, a major U.S. military contract was being awarded to the European consortium.

But the interesting development is that Murtha and other Democrats in Congress chose to target Republican presidential candidate, Senator John McCain for his role in killing the original Boeing deal of 2003. A Democratic Congressman from Illinois, Rahm Emmanuel, where Boeing is now headquartered, accused McCain of being responsible “for sending jobs overseas.” In a statement McCain was quoted as standing by his decision to stop the 2003 Boeing deal, and said that “I have always insisted that the Air Force buy major weapons through fair and open competition.” McCain had also stressed that impact on American jobs is not the main issue here but what is important is “to create the best weapons system we can at minimum cost to taxpayers.”

The presidential hopeful, Barack Obama, a Democratic Senator from Illinois, expressed shock and opposition to the deal. On this issue, he was not supporting change, for a change. His competitor for the Democratic nomination, Senator Hillary Clinton of New York said she could not understand how Airbus, against which the United States brought a suit at the World Trade Organization in 2004 for illegal subsidies, could win the tender. Of course, Clinton should be reminded that there is a counter-suit against Boeing in the same organization for what Airbus claims are essentially subsidies in the form of Pentagon military contracts, which bolster its passenger jet activities.

It is likely that after the fog clears over who the Democratic nominee will be, one of the issues McCain will be attacked on is his role in foiling Boeing’s bid to win the air tanker contract. It is one of the few areas they can challenge McCain on security. And the line will follow doubts about the wisdom of relying on foreign powers to provide parts for a system necessary for American defense. But this would be a mistake for two main reasons.

First, as Secretary of Defense Gates already noted, there is an increasing globalizing of the defense industry. While this is the first time in more than six decades that the U.S. has opted for a major strategic system, in such great numbers, produced by its allies, the real shift in policy was initiated when it was agreed to allow allies to ‘buy’ into the development of the Joint Strike Fighter in 2002. This introduced a major change in the willingness to ‘share’ technological know-how by the Pentagon and the American defense industry. This was followed by the symbolic but poignant decision to opt for a European helicopter, and in collaboration with the largest U.S. defense contractor, Lockheed, will provide a replacement for Marine One, used to ferry the President and other senior officials. Autarchy in defense production is a thing of bygone eras – both because of costs, technologies, alliance politics and shifting international conditions.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, this deal is a watershed in what it symbolizes for the western alliance. This is a sign of a new trend – motivated by a new understanding that the U.S. cannot go it alone, whether in Afghanistan or in future challenges. The recognition that its allies can provide the cutting edge technology for a system that is crucially important to American power projection and the ability of the western alliance to safeguard shared interests globally is a change in Washington. Just as this shift should not go unnoticed in European capitals, it is equally important for American politicians, and especially those aspiring to become the next Commander in Chief, to overcome biases whose demise is long overdue.
Michalis Firillas
7 March, 2008

USAF buying Airbus is a shift that Europe must not leave unnoticed

The U.S. Air Force decision to recommend that Boeing’s arch-rival Airbus be selected to build a fleet of airborne tankers came as a shock to many. Whether the deal for 179 KC-45 aircraft (the USAF designation for the chosen air tankers), worth nearly $40 billion dollars over a 15 year period stays unchanged or not, remains to be seen. Some believe that Boeing will fight this hard, as will Congressmen bent on capitalizing over this ‘violation’ of the ‘Buy American’ motto. Given the thousands of jobs this project will create in the U.S, the fact that 60% of the aircraft will be made in the U.S. and with American components, and that the local partner in this venture is the venerable Northrop-Grumman, the third largest defense contractor in the U.S., it will be very difficult for the patriots to ground this deal. In any case, however one looks at it, this was the right decision and its implications are much more than economic.

From the start this was Boeing’s battle to lose – and it did. Five years ago the USAF was ready to sign a deal for tanker aircraft based on the 767, but cancelled as a result of a scandal that brought down Boeing’s CEO. This only exacerbated the already long overdue replacement of the ageing fleet of nearly 500 aerial tankers in service with the USAF, some dating back to the 1950s. Moreover, the chosen package is better: the A330, on which the KC-45 will be based, is a more modern, efficient, and larger aircraft, which offers greater flexibility in air refueling but is also capable of ferrying materials and personnel without compromising its main role as an airborne gas station.

No less important is what this deal does for Northrop-Grumman and by extension the ability of the U.S. defense industry to meet both qualitatively and quantitatively, the needs of the U.S. armed forces. Created in a merger of two Cold War mainstays of the U.S. aerospace industry in 1994, the company managed to survive further consolidation in the industry when the government did not authorize a Lockheed offer to buy it. The likelihood that the KC-45 contract will grow to as much as a $100 billion deal over the coming years is a major boost for Northrop-Grumman. The reduction of the bloated Cold War defense industry to two behemoths – Boeing and Lockheed – seemed like a natural evolution of a changing security environment. But there is a limit to the kind of streamlining that the defense industry can be allowed to undergo – certainly in light of the security challenges the U.S. is likely to face in the future.

But this deal is most of all a watershed in what it symbolizes for the western alliance. This is the first time in more than six decades that the U.S. has opted for a major, strategic system produced by its allies. Prior to this, rarely and for very specific reasons did the U.S. buy foreign systems, always in limited quantities. Without overstating the matter, there are signs of a new trend – motivated by a new understanding that the U.S. cannot go it alone, whether in Afghanistan or in future challenges. The recognition that its allies can provide the cutting edge technology for a system that is crucially important to American power projection and the ability of the western alliance to safeguard shared interests globally is a change in Washington that should not go unnoticed in European capitals.
Michalis Firillas
4 March, 2008