This appeared on March 11, 2008 on the Haaretz website. See url below
It is not too often Israel’s Foreign Ministry officials receive protestations for something not related to the Palestinians or the Arab-Israeli conflict at large. One could almost imagine a rather comical embarrassment when the Cypriot ambassador to Israel dropped in yesterday to complain about plans by the Turkish Cypriots to set up an economic interests office in Tel Aviv. Ambassador George Zodiates, normally a mild mannered man, held nothing back, drawing an analogy between the breakaway republic of Northern Cyprus and Hamas, asking how Israel would react if the radical Palestinian Islamic group sought to set up an office representing its interests in third countries.
So, what is this all about, and how will it affect the normally cordial and smooth relations between Israel and Cyprus? Like any good story, there are at least three sides to it. Israel had known for some time of plans by the Turkish Cypriots, mainly through Turkey, to try and establish some form of mission in Tel Aviv. Israel rejected out of hand any notion that such representation would have a diplomatic character, insisting that Jerusalem “operates in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations’ which does not recognize Northern Cyprus as an independent state. That is not to say that there have not been voices in the Israeli establishment calling for such recognition in order to curry favor with Ankara. Not surprisingly those suggesting this are primarily from the defense establishment, who are not exactly well known for grasping diplomatic nuances and international law.
Understanding the problem facing many countries unwilling to break with international law, the Turkish Cypriots and their advisers in Ankara opted for the trade office scenario. It is less threatening and hard to oppose legally. It does not necessitate diplomatic recognition yet its activities constitute what is essentially 75% of the work of any average diplomatic mission in Israel: public relations, trade, cultural exchanges, spreading the word that a state exists. As such, arguing, as one unnamed source quoted Sunday in Barak Ravid’s report, that this is not an attempt at “politics through the back door” is disingenuous. That is precisely what it is and that is the purpose of a broader onslaught of such offices Turkish Cypriots have sought to establish in key capitals the world over, most recently in Rome. No Israeli investor really needs a trade office in Tel Aviv to learn about options in northern Cyprus: anyone who has not already heard that there are real estate finds in northern Cyprus, with questionable ownership documents, can’t afford them anyway.
As for the Greek Cypriots, their angst over this stems from one basic fact: the sovereignty of Cyprus is all they have in a geopolitical environment where they are otherwise defenseless. Indeed, the Greek Cypriots are holding on to their internationally recognized status like a lifeline that protects their very existence. Any breach to that sovereignty, beyond that already suffered in 1974, when foreign intervention toppled the legitimate government, usurped their upper hand in inter-communal relations, and ushered in Turkish troops who continue to maintain their hold over northern Cyprus, is perceived by them to be tantamount to extinction. This is not automatically understood by visitors to Cyprus – certainly not since the spring 2003, when the Turkish army began lifting restrictions to freedom of movement by Greeks to the north. The complex status of Cyprus, its Greek and Turkish communities, the role of ‘mother’ countries Greece and Turkey, as well as that of Britain, the European Union and the international community, are beyond this discussion. But understanding what sovereignty means to the Greek Cypriots, and by extension to the Turkish Cypriots, is the beginning to appreciating the current state of the conflict on the island – which some Israelis have dubbed ‘virtual’ because it has, fortunately, been primarily non-violent for the past three decades.
Israel is in a bind and there are plenty of people at the Foreign Ministry who realize that this is something that will not go away soon. It is not the Greek Cypriots who they are worried about, but the list of others who may follow in the Turkish Cypriot footsteps, causing diplomatic headaches with more powerful neighbors and allies than Cyprus can ever be. The Kosovar Albanians may choose the option of a trade office – even though Israel has not extended diplomatic recognition to their fledgling statelet, drawing Serbian ire, and very likely that of their Russian patrons. Or, it could be the Kurds from northern Iraq, who may want to cash in on decades of cooperation with Israel, by breaking ground on a future diplomatic mission through the establishment of a trade office in Tel Aviv. I am sure Ankara will love that.
Michalis Firillas
March 11, 2008
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/963177.html
Showing posts with label kurds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label kurds. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 11, 2008
Friday, March 7, 2008
Kosovo: Coming soon to a theater near you
Originally published in the editorial pages of Haaretz, February 29, 2008
It is not a good omen when a national flag is dominated by the actual outline of the geographic territory the state covers. It's probably a sign that there has been so much disagreement over the very decision to create the state, that drawing the shape of the country on the flag is meant to remind us all of its existence, manifesting the reality of being. Of course, it could always be that some foreign mediator, exhausted by the bickering of the natives, gave up trying to find shared national symbols and decided to state the most obvious common denominator. Thankfully, there have been only two such cases since 1945: Cyprus in 1960, and now Kosovo.
Of course, there are fundamental differences between them. Cyprus was recognized as an independent, sovereign state by the United Nations following the signing of detailed accords to govern the relationship between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island and the roles of external "guarantors," all meant to ensure that the fledgling republic would work. Kosovo has so far been recognized by fewer than two dozen of the UN's 192 members; it was created not by accord but by force; and while there is a great deal of enthusiasm among its majority ethnic-Albanian population, it is more the presence of an army of European Union and UN officials, as well as lots of NATO troops, that has gotten it this far. Another major difference is that while Kosovo is a breakaway state from within the recognized territory of another, Cyprus has its own breakaway state in the north, which was created - not unlike Kosovo - by outside intervention.
But the differences are not what is important to understand about Kosovo and Cyprus. What's important are the fundamentals, which are the reason that so many states expressed either direct opposition or skepticism about Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence earlier this month. The fundamentals are simple because they are the building blocks of the international system by which the world has been organized and coordinated since the introduction of the UN and its charter in 1945. These are based on the concepts of statehood, inviolable sovereign borders, consensus and international agreements. Most important, it is a system that stipulates that UN member states decide who the new members in this club will be; on the basis of their decision, Israel was given the legal right to exist, as was Cyprus. Not so Kosovo.
On the other hand, if there is something to be learned from history, it is that conditions are in constant flux. As such, Kosovo may be a watershed, ushering in a new era of international arrangements. Nonetheless, whether we decide to chuck out everything else that preceded it, in one juvenile swoop, or not, is up to us. Indeed, the most worrisome thing is that Kosovo may turn into an international precedent - something that clearly also worries its most fervent supporters, who emphasize at every turn that this is not the case. These assertions do not seem to assuage most UN members. Officials from Beijing to Buenos Aires, from Manila to Mexico City, are shaking their heads in disbelief. "Is it possible," they wonder, "that we might find ourselves in Serbia's shoes in a few years?" Perhaps.
If indeed the international system, as we have known it since 1945, is undergoing a devolution, with the UN becoming increasingly emasculated and its rule book sidelined, it is important to begin working on a new system. Certainly, international order has been undergoing radical changes since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the start of accelerated globalization and the emergence of nearly unfettered access to information. It is only natural that national minorities, disgruntled groups and oppressed communities will become more vocal and go as far as actively pursuing separatist policies. This is a trend that will likely intensify and is guaranteed to lead to bloodshed. Will it also lead to major international conflict between states?
With the advent of the era of nationalism, more than two centuries ago, the world has had to rebuild the system governing relations between states three times, starting with the end of the Napoleonic Wars. All three times, the rebuilding followed catastrophic fighting on a global scale. Neither war nor peace are inevitable, nor are they acts of nature. Mankind has sought to regulate both, through law, shared rules and consensus. Kosovo suggests that it is time for major readjustments, of the kind that are likely to challenge the sanctity we have so far attributed to the main building blocks of international systems: states and their sovereign rights. If Albanians in Kosovo deserve an independent state, then maybe so do Kurds, Turkish Cypriots, Druze, Romany, Basques - the list can be endless. The European Union may offer an interim model for a way forward - and indeed it is the promise of EU membership that is meant to sweeten the pill for the Serbs and curb Albanian enthusiasm. But first, maybe a decision needs to be made that fighting and dying for a piece of cloth with a colorful design, or just a plain old outline of a territory, is simply not worth it.
Michalis Firillas
February 28, 2008
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/959377.html
It is not a good omen when a national flag is dominated by the actual outline of the geographic territory the state covers. It's probably a sign that there has been so much disagreement over the very decision to create the state, that drawing the shape of the country on the flag is meant to remind us all of its existence, manifesting the reality of being. Of course, it could always be that some foreign mediator, exhausted by the bickering of the natives, gave up trying to find shared national symbols and decided to state the most obvious common denominator. Thankfully, there have been only two such cases since 1945: Cyprus in 1960, and now Kosovo.
Of course, there are fundamental differences between them. Cyprus was recognized as an independent, sovereign state by the United Nations following the signing of detailed accords to govern the relationship between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island and the roles of external "guarantors," all meant to ensure that the fledgling republic would work. Kosovo has so far been recognized by fewer than two dozen of the UN's 192 members; it was created not by accord but by force; and while there is a great deal of enthusiasm among its majority ethnic-Albanian population, it is more the presence of an army of European Union and UN officials, as well as lots of NATO troops, that has gotten it this far. Another major difference is that while Kosovo is a breakaway state from within the recognized territory of another, Cyprus has its own breakaway state in the north, which was created - not unlike Kosovo - by outside intervention.
But the differences are not what is important to understand about Kosovo and Cyprus. What's important are the fundamentals, which are the reason that so many states expressed either direct opposition or skepticism about Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence earlier this month. The fundamentals are simple because they are the building blocks of the international system by which the world has been organized and coordinated since the introduction of the UN and its charter in 1945. These are based on the concepts of statehood, inviolable sovereign borders, consensus and international agreements. Most important, it is a system that stipulates that UN member states decide who the new members in this club will be; on the basis of their decision, Israel was given the legal right to exist, as was Cyprus. Not so Kosovo.
On the other hand, if there is something to be learned from history, it is that conditions are in constant flux. As such, Kosovo may be a watershed, ushering in a new era of international arrangements. Nonetheless, whether we decide to chuck out everything else that preceded it, in one juvenile swoop, or not, is up to us. Indeed, the most worrisome thing is that Kosovo may turn into an international precedent - something that clearly also worries its most fervent supporters, who emphasize at every turn that this is not the case. These assertions do not seem to assuage most UN members. Officials from Beijing to Buenos Aires, from Manila to Mexico City, are shaking their heads in disbelief. "Is it possible," they wonder, "that we might find ourselves in Serbia's shoes in a few years?" Perhaps.
If indeed the international system, as we have known it since 1945, is undergoing a devolution, with the UN becoming increasingly emasculated and its rule book sidelined, it is important to begin working on a new system. Certainly, international order has been undergoing radical changes since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the start of accelerated globalization and the emergence of nearly unfettered access to information. It is only natural that national minorities, disgruntled groups and oppressed communities will become more vocal and go as far as actively pursuing separatist policies. This is a trend that will likely intensify and is guaranteed to lead to bloodshed. Will it also lead to major international conflict between states?
With the advent of the era of nationalism, more than two centuries ago, the world has had to rebuild the system governing relations between states three times, starting with the end of the Napoleonic Wars. All three times, the rebuilding followed catastrophic fighting on a global scale. Neither war nor peace are inevitable, nor are they acts of nature. Mankind has sought to regulate both, through law, shared rules and consensus. Kosovo suggests that it is time for major readjustments, of the kind that are likely to challenge the sanctity we have so far attributed to the main building blocks of international systems: states and their sovereign rights. If Albanians in Kosovo deserve an independent state, then maybe so do Kurds, Turkish Cypriots, Druze, Romany, Basques - the list can be endless. The European Union may offer an interim model for a way forward - and indeed it is the promise of EU membership that is meant to sweeten the pill for the Serbs and curb Albanian enthusiasm. But first, maybe a decision needs to be made that fighting and dying for a piece of cloth with a colorful design, or just a plain old outline of a territory, is simply not worth it.
Michalis Firillas
February 28, 2008
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/959377.html
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