Originally published in Haaretz in a more concise version in Hebrew, and in this version on the English website, February 25, 2008. Links to both below.
Sunday night's election of Demetris Christofias, the Communist party's secretary general, as President of the Republic of Cyprus is indeed historic. For the first time the powerful Communist party, AKEL, no longer satisfied with its traditional role as king-maker, took the risk and proposed its leader as candidate for the presidency. Also, for the first time since independence in 1960, 390 eligible Turkish Cypriots living in the government controlled south, voted in a presidential election. But that is where historic developments end, because when it comes to the problem most often associated with Cyprus, its division into Turkish and government controlled parts, the fundamental problems remain the same.
Since April 2004, the outgoing President Tassos Papadopoulos was lambasted in the western media, by supporters of Turkey's accession to the European Union, and by political opponents at home, for his stance against the UN sponsored plan to reunify Cyprus. Papadopoulos managed to rally more than 75 percent of Greek Cypriots against the plan. Henceforth, he was blamed for the impasse that befell talks between the two communities, and was used as an excuse eight months ago by Christofias to pull out of the coalition government and declare his candidacy.
Indeed, last week's surprising elimination of Papadopoulos during the first round of elections, led many pundits to hail this as a positive omen for renewed efforts to reunify the island. It would be mistaken to think that Papadopoulos, the last of the 'old guard' of Cypriot politicians, was ousted because of his refusal to budge from his strict interpretation of what constitutes Greek Cypriot interests. Some proof of this is that the centrist party that backed him, DIKO, in its vast majority opted for Christofias and not his rightist opponent, Ioannis Kassoulides. This is precisely because most Greek Cypriots who voted against the UN plan in 2004 are still not convinced that its proponents, Kassoulides among them, will hold steadfastly to Greek Cypriot interests and not, to use a commonly used term in Cyprus, "sell us out."
Papadopoulos was eliminated for two main reasons - both domestic. The first has to do with pure miscalculation, even mismanagement of his campaign. Most voters were convinced that Papadopoulos would go through to the final round, and voted along partisan lines. Since the two largest parties in Cyprus are AKEL and DISY, the rightist party which backed Kassoulides, that is where the votes went. Secondly, an incumbent government in Cyprus always has many disgruntled voters to cater to. Notwithstanding the severe attacks against Papadopoulos in the past six months, for allegedly "greasing" the palms of voters many voted for the two main parties on the basis of promises for post-election jobs, agricultural grants, and other benefits.
What will Christofias do now? Like his rightist opponent, he expressed interest in meeting with the Turkish Cypriots and moving the issue forward. He has three advantages over Papadopoulos: many Turkish Cypriots, especially on the left, believe that the head of AKEL, the only party that historically had members from both communities, will be a more agreeable interlocutor than Papadopoulos, whose nationalist credentials stigmatized him; second, he is a fresh face, but at the same time an experienced hand in Cypriot politics; finally, he will be a novelty, the first Communist leader of an EU member state, and this may gain him a period of grace both within the Union and among those involved in the Cypriot issue.
But the obstacles preventing the reunification of Cyprus are substantial, and it is hard to see how Christofias will be able to overcome them unless dramatic changes are made on the Turkish side, and predominantly in Ankara. The same problems that plagued the UN plan, namely refugees, property rights, issues of sovereignty, the presence of Turkish settlers, and the continued presence of Turkish troops on the island, all contribute to the current impasse. Is the EU carrot still enticing enough for Ankara to budge? Is it even relevant in light of recent developments in Europe where key leaders view Turkish accession as impractical? Does Kosovo constitute a precedent in the case of Cyprus? No less important, do the Greek Cypriots really want to coexist in a bizonal federation with the Turks, or has this formula expired?
Michalis Firillas
February 25, 2008
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/957951.html
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=957715&contrassID=2&subContrassID=16&sbSubContrassID=0
Showing posts with label united nations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label united nations. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 12, 2008
Friday, March 7, 2008
Kosovo: Coming soon to a theater near you
Originally published in the editorial pages of Haaretz, February 29, 2008
It is not a good omen when a national flag is dominated by the actual outline of the geographic territory the state covers. It's probably a sign that there has been so much disagreement over the very decision to create the state, that drawing the shape of the country on the flag is meant to remind us all of its existence, manifesting the reality of being. Of course, it could always be that some foreign mediator, exhausted by the bickering of the natives, gave up trying to find shared national symbols and decided to state the most obvious common denominator. Thankfully, there have been only two such cases since 1945: Cyprus in 1960, and now Kosovo.
Of course, there are fundamental differences between them. Cyprus was recognized as an independent, sovereign state by the United Nations following the signing of detailed accords to govern the relationship between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island and the roles of external "guarantors," all meant to ensure that the fledgling republic would work. Kosovo has so far been recognized by fewer than two dozen of the UN's 192 members; it was created not by accord but by force; and while there is a great deal of enthusiasm among its majority ethnic-Albanian population, it is more the presence of an army of European Union and UN officials, as well as lots of NATO troops, that has gotten it this far. Another major difference is that while Kosovo is a breakaway state from within the recognized territory of another, Cyprus has its own breakaway state in the north, which was created - not unlike Kosovo - by outside intervention.
But the differences are not what is important to understand about Kosovo and Cyprus. What's important are the fundamentals, which are the reason that so many states expressed either direct opposition or skepticism about Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence earlier this month. The fundamentals are simple because they are the building blocks of the international system by which the world has been organized and coordinated since the introduction of the UN and its charter in 1945. These are based on the concepts of statehood, inviolable sovereign borders, consensus and international agreements. Most important, it is a system that stipulates that UN member states decide who the new members in this club will be; on the basis of their decision, Israel was given the legal right to exist, as was Cyprus. Not so Kosovo.
On the other hand, if there is something to be learned from history, it is that conditions are in constant flux. As such, Kosovo may be a watershed, ushering in a new era of international arrangements. Nonetheless, whether we decide to chuck out everything else that preceded it, in one juvenile swoop, or not, is up to us. Indeed, the most worrisome thing is that Kosovo may turn into an international precedent - something that clearly also worries its most fervent supporters, who emphasize at every turn that this is not the case. These assertions do not seem to assuage most UN members. Officials from Beijing to Buenos Aires, from Manila to Mexico City, are shaking their heads in disbelief. "Is it possible," they wonder, "that we might find ourselves in Serbia's shoes in a few years?" Perhaps.
If indeed the international system, as we have known it since 1945, is undergoing a devolution, with the UN becoming increasingly emasculated and its rule book sidelined, it is important to begin working on a new system. Certainly, international order has been undergoing radical changes since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the start of accelerated globalization and the emergence of nearly unfettered access to information. It is only natural that national minorities, disgruntled groups and oppressed communities will become more vocal and go as far as actively pursuing separatist policies. This is a trend that will likely intensify and is guaranteed to lead to bloodshed. Will it also lead to major international conflict between states?
With the advent of the era of nationalism, more than two centuries ago, the world has had to rebuild the system governing relations between states three times, starting with the end of the Napoleonic Wars. All three times, the rebuilding followed catastrophic fighting on a global scale. Neither war nor peace are inevitable, nor are they acts of nature. Mankind has sought to regulate both, through law, shared rules and consensus. Kosovo suggests that it is time for major readjustments, of the kind that are likely to challenge the sanctity we have so far attributed to the main building blocks of international systems: states and their sovereign rights. If Albanians in Kosovo deserve an independent state, then maybe so do Kurds, Turkish Cypriots, Druze, Romany, Basques - the list can be endless. The European Union may offer an interim model for a way forward - and indeed it is the promise of EU membership that is meant to sweeten the pill for the Serbs and curb Albanian enthusiasm. But first, maybe a decision needs to be made that fighting and dying for a piece of cloth with a colorful design, or just a plain old outline of a territory, is simply not worth it.
Michalis Firillas
February 28, 2008
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/959377.html
It is not a good omen when a national flag is dominated by the actual outline of the geographic territory the state covers. It's probably a sign that there has been so much disagreement over the very decision to create the state, that drawing the shape of the country on the flag is meant to remind us all of its existence, manifesting the reality of being. Of course, it could always be that some foreign mediator, exhausted by the bickering of the natives, gave up trying to find shared national symbols and decided to state the most obvious common denominator. Thankfully, there have been only two such cases since 1945: Cyprus in 1960, and now Kosovo.
Of course, there are fundamental differences between them. Cyprus was recognized as an independent, sovereign state by the United Nations following the signing of detailed accords to govern the relationship between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island and the roles of external "guarantors," all meant to ensure that the fledgling republic would work. Kosovo has so far been recognized by fewer than two dozen of the UN's 192 members; it was created not by accord but by force; and while there is a great deal of enthusiasm among its majority ethnic-Albanian population, it is more the presence of an army of European Union and UN officials, as well as lots of NATO troops, that has gotten it this far. Another major difference is that while Kosovo is a breakaway state from within the recognized territory of another, Cyprus has its own breakaway state in the north, which was created - not unlike Kosovo - by outside intervention.
But the differences are not what is important to understand about Kosovo and Cyprus. What's important are the fundamentals, which are the reason that so many states expressed either direct opposition or skepticism about Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence earlier this month. The fundamentals are simple because they are the building blocks of the international system by which the world has been organized and coordinated since the introduction of the UN and its charter in 1945. These are based on the concepts of statehood, inviolable sovereign borders, consensus and international agreements. Most important, it is a system that stipulates that UN member states decide who the new members in this club will be; on the basis of their decision, Israel was given the legal right to exist, as was Cyprus. Not so Kosovo.
On the other hand, if there is something to be learned from history, it is that conditions are in constant flux. As such, Kosovo may be a watershed, ushering in a new era of international arrangements. Nonetheless, whether we decide to chuck out everything else that preceded it, in one juvenile swoop, or not, is up to us. Indeed, the most worrisome thing is that Kosovo may turn into an international precedent - something that clearly also worries its most fervent supporters, who emphasize at every turn that this is not the case. These assertions do not seem to assuage most UN members. Officials from Beijing to Buenos Aires, from Manila to Mexico City, are shaking their heads in disbelief. "Is it possible," they wonder, "that we might find ourselves in Serbia's shoes in a few years?" Perhaps.
If indeed the international system, as we have known it since 1945, is undergoing a devolution, with the UN becoming increasingly emasculated and its rule book sidelined, it is important to begin working on a new system. Certainly, international order has been undergoing radical changes since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the start of accelerated globalization and the emergence of nearly unfettered access to information. It is only natural that national minorities, disgruntled groups and oppressed communities will become more vocal and go as far as actively pursuing separatist policies. This is a trend that will likely intensify and is guaranteed to lead to bloodshed. Will it also lead to major international conflict between states?
With the advent of the era of nationalism, more than two centuries ago, the world has had to rebuild the system governing relations between states three times, starting with the end of the Napoleonic Wars. All three times, the rebuilding followed catastrophic fighting on a global scale. Neither war nor peace are inevitable, nor are they acts of nature. Mankind has sought to regulate both, through law, shared rules and consensus. Kosovo suggests that it is time for major readjustments, of the kind that are likely to challenge the sanctity we have so far attributed to the main building blocks of international systems: states and their sovereign rights. If Albanians in Kosovo deserve an independent state, then maybe so do Kurds, Turkish Cypriots, Druze, Romany, Basques - the list can be endless. The European Union may offer an interim model for a way forward - and indeed it is the promise of EU membership that is meant to sweeten the pill for the Serbs and curb Albanian enthusiasm. But first, maybe a decision needs to be made that fighting and dying for a piece of cloth with a colorful design, or just a plain old outline of a territory, is simply not worth it.
Michalis Firillas
February 28, 2008
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/959377.html
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